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THE RAGGED EDGE OF RUGGED INDIVIDUALISM: WAGE
THEFT AND THE PERSONALIZATION OF SOCIAL HARM
By Matthew Fritz-Mauer*

ABSTRACT
Every year, millions of low-wage workers suffer wage theft when their employers
refuse to pay them what they have earned. Wage theft is both prevalent and highly
impactful. It costs individuals thousands each year in unpaid earnings, siphons
tens of billions of dollars from low-income communities, depletes the government of
necessary resources, distorts the competitive labor market, and causes significant
personal harm to its victims. In recent years, states and cities have passed new
laws to attack the problem. These legal changes are important. They are also,
broadly speaking, failing the people they are supposed to protect.
This Article fills a significant gap in the literature by detailing the full scope of
damage caused by wage theft and by critically examining the dominant approach
to combatting it. Drawing on existing research and nearly 60 in-depth interviews
about wage theft in the District of Columbia, this Article paints a thorough picture
of wage theft’s harms, explores why and how existing reforms are failing, and
explains what must be done instead.
Enforcement schemes reflect the current view that wage theft is a personal harm
properly addressed on a case-by-case basis in the civil justice system. As a result,
reforms—both as written and implemented—generally attempt to empower and
incentivize individuals to action. These approaches are failing. They
misunderstand what wage theft is, how it plays out, and how it must be
addressed. Wage theft is not an individual problem, but a social harm, and it
therefore requires a broad, public response. Because low-wage workers live
economically precarious lives and are so dependent on their jobs to survive, they
almost never take formal legal action over violations of their rights. Government
bodies cannot continue to rely on workers themselves to enforce their rights, but
must take on a new role as robust, active, and strategic enforcers. Unless and
until they do, millions of people will continue to suffer violations of their basic
workplace rights with no meaningful recourse.

* Associate attorney, The Kelman Buescher Law Firm; J.D., University of California,
Irvine School of Law (2015); Ph.D., Department of Criminology, Law and Society, University
of California, Irvine (2019). I owe significant thanks to Carroll Seron, Mario Barnes, Valerie
Jenness, and Kaaryn Gustafson, who have always provided excellent, supportive, and critical
feedback. My employers also deserve great credit for creating an environment that gives me
the personal and intellectual space to pursue this kind of work.
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INTRODUCTION
For eighteen months, Cora did all the grunt work at Eclectic
1
Coif, an upscale men’s salon in Washington, D.C. that charges $70
2
a haircut. She cleaned the bathrooms, washed and folded the
laundry, swept the floors, made coffee, and shampooed up to 80
clients a day. It was not glamorous work. Sometimes it was downright disgusting, actually, like when the basement flooded from a
backed-up sewage line and she had to clean it up. But Cora was a
Marine. She had gone through boot camp. She prides herself on
her toughness, her willingness to go the extra mile to accomplish
the mission. The work might have been undignified, but Cora was
not a quitter. Besides, she needed the money.
It was not much money. Ten dollars an hour, plus tips. A far cry
from where Cora had been a few years earlier, working at a large
law firm and making $56,000 a year plus benefits. Not bad for a
single mom without a college degree. Not bad for a woman who,
when we met, was $10,000 behind on her rent and struggling to
find a job.
What happened to Cora during the Great Recession of 2008 is
what happened to a lot of people: her employer downsized. Her
entire department moved to another state, and she was not invited
along. Things took a turn after that. Cora’s lifestyle and friends
changed over time, and her old career was not calling her back. So,
she moved away from the corporate legal world and into the jobs
she could find, which is how she wound up working for $10 an
hour plus tips.
There was a problem, though: hardly anybody tipped her. In a
given ten-hour shift, Cora washed 50 to 80 heads of hair. A few clients might tip, but sometimes an entire workday would go by without anything. Most of the time, Cora earned less than the mini3
mum wage.

1. Throughout this Article, I have given pseudonyms to low-wage workers, their employers, and their coworkers. The attorneys, workers’ rights activists, employers, and government agents who participated typically chose to identify themselves. Where I use a person’s first name only, it is a pseudonym; where I use a first and last name, it is not.
2. Interview with Cora, Low-wage Worker, in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on
file with author).
3. This is not how tipped jobs are supposed to work, especially at a place like Eclectic
Coif. Businesses in the District of Columbia are allowed to pay their tipped employees below
the regular minimum wage, as long as over the course of a workweek those employees earn,
on average, at least the minimum wage for every hour that they work. See Wage and Hour
Laws, D.C. OFF. ATT’Y GEN., https://oag.dc.gov/workers-rights/wage-and-hour-laws
[https://perma.cc/VK89-NY2K]. When they do not, the employer is required to cut the
worker a check for the difference between her actual hourly rate and what the minimum
wage requires.
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Cora tried talking to Charlotte, the salon’s business manager,
but it was a dead end. “The tips will come,” Charlotte assured her.
“Just keep doing the job.” This was no solace, to say the least, and it
did not pay the bills. The minimum wage violations were constant,
but there were other violations, too. Cora never got paid overtime,
and she sometimes got paid late. One time when her wages were
late, she asked Charlotte where her money was. Charlotte threatened to fire her.
This wage theft took a toll on the former Marine. “It was just so
frustrating,” says Cora. Charlotte’s response made her feel worthless, and dismissed.
I couldn’t pay my rent. . . . [E]very two weeks I’d get paid,
that check would go right to my landlord. So then my tips,
my little bitty tips, were what I needed to eat, to literally go
into the grocery store. . . . I would have to get on the train
and go out to Maryland and shop because the prices were
lower.
But transportation costs money. Everything costs money. Cora was
working full time, supporting only herself, and every week she
struggled to put food on the table.
At 45, Cora had had a career, she had raised a child, and she
couldn’t even make minimum wage. But what could she do? “I
knew that I wasn’t making enough and it wasn’t fair,” she says, “but
I didn’t have the knowledge or the strength to go after [my wages],
to fight for myself.” Depression settled in and got worse over time.
“One day it was really bad. It was like suicidal thoughts, you know?
And when I felt that, that cold from the knife on my wrist, I was
like, ‘Whoa! That’s a little too far . . . you gotta, really gotta get
some help.’ ” Finally, she began to see a therapist.
But after a year and a half of wage theft, Cora’s work ethic finally
cracked. “I think I basically just got myself fired because I had given up, you know? They weren’t tipping me and they weren’t paying
me.” Her work slipped. She stopped putting forth her Marine-best.
When Charlotte terminated her, Cora felt relief. Seeing no other
options, she just tried to move on.
*

* *

As a journeyman plumber with 21 years of experience, Earl has
4
real expertise. His skills are sought after in a constantly-growing

4. Interview with Earl, Journeyman Plumber, in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript
on file with author).
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city, and he is capable of earning a high hourly rate. In fact, he has
at times brought home $40 an hour, enough to provide a decent
living.
Earl’s ability to make middle-class wages is, unfortunately, often
just theoretical. In Earl’s experience, construction contractors undercut even their skilled workers. Throughout his career, employers have denied him overtime, misclassified him as an independent
contractor, refused to pay him what they promised, and even refused to pay him anything at all. Once, for example, an employer
told him he would be making $40 an hour. That all changed when
he started work. “I ended up getting somewhere around $18,” he
explains, “[s]o it was either [a] take it or leave it thing.” He took it.
It was better than sitting at home collecting unemployment, and
Earl is a man who takes pride in working.
In the grand scheme of things, these offenses are relatively rare.
Most jobs pass without any drama. But because he can earn a high
hourly rate, this wage theft costs Earl a lot of money. When his
employers cut his hourly rate in half or refuse to pay overtime, he
experiences a double-digit-per-hour dollar reduction. Beyond that,
the principle bothers him. Earl knows his rights and he knows what
is fair, and his employers’ casual disregard of both is extremely
frustrating.
When employers cheat him, though, Earl’s only response is to
argue and then, if he can, avoid working for them in the future.
Only once has he tried to pursue legal action, and that was because
a contractor refused to pay him anything. He cannot afford a lawyer, does not have any legal training, and does not know how to
bring a wage claim. “Where do you take your complaint?” he asks.
“Do you take it to the city? . . . Where do I go? Who do I complain
to?”
But the lack of information isn’t the real barrier. Earl is more
than capable of figuring out where to go. In his view, the government is not interested in taking action unless somebody makes a
report. When I ask whether he has ever considered doing that, he
laughs. “Okay,” he says patiently, “if you step forward, what are the
odds? You’re outnumbered with all the contractors here, and then
you’ll be scapegoated. You won’t be able to get no work. You won’t
be able to find a job. You won’t be able to get nothing. So how do
you step forward?”
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In early 2018, Arbalis offered Olivia a job in charge of the organization’s programming. 5 The salary was not great—$35,000 a year,
no benefits—but she believed in the non-profit’s mission.
Though only 28, Olivia’s resume is impressive. She speaks four
languages (English, Bengali, Hindi, and some German), has two
master’s degrees, and carries herself with an air of professional
competence. At first it seemed like the Arbalis Founder and President, Steven, recognized her value. He praised her effusively in the
offer letter and spoke in idealistic, inspiring ways about the job.
Olivia’s opinion of the job quickly soured. The days were longer
than promised, and the low pay began to grate after 50 hours a
week. Worse, though, Steven was hard to work for. He nitpicked
her work, made condescending and racist comments, and blamed
Olivia for things that she felt were not her fault. Olivia began to
look for other jobs, but things came to a head when she took a sick
day.
Steven responded badly. He insisted she was violating workplace
6
rules and unlawfully demanded a doctor’s note. Olivia refused,
explaining that she could not afford to see a doctor. Steven fired
her, refused to pay Olivia her final wages, and, when she demanded them, escalated his threats. He accused her of a litany of imagined offenses and threatened legal action. If Steven sued Olivia, he
promised she would be liable for more than $150,000 in damages.
Worst of all, he told her she had committed an unnamed felony
that, he claimed, carried a five-year prison term and $250,000 fine.
These were stunning threats, especially for a recent immigrant
with little savings and no knowledge of the American legal system.
The experience was deeply upsetting and strained her relationship
with her husband. “I’m depressed and unhappy because of this
whole situation,” Olivia says. “I don’t really feel like going anywhere or doing anything.”
Olivia found a new and better job, but Steven continued to refuse to pay her. She contacted several attorneys, but none would
take her case. Her claim, worth about $2,400 in unpaid wages, was
just too small.
With nowhere else to turn, Olivia filed a wage claim with the District of Columbia Department of Employment Services (DOES).
The experience was an exercise in frustration. She learned that the

5. Interview with Olivia, Non-profit Emp., in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on
file with author).
6. See D.C. CODE § 32-531.04(a)(1) (2020) (prohibiting employers from demanding
doctor’s certifications for leave of less than three days).
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agency is disorganized, slow, and uncommunicative. DOES repeatedly lost evidence, like Olivia’s paystubs and offer letter, forcing
her to re-submit information. Her claims examiner often ignored
her emails and phone calls, confused the details of her claim, and
refused to provide her with a copy of her own complaint. It took
two and a half months for DOES to even send notice of Olivia’s
wage claim to Arbalis and another month before the agency informed Olivia that it would be holding a factfinding and mediation
conference. That conference, however, never got scheduled.
“It is getting ridiculous,” Olivia said after several months. “[I am]
really confused about why it is taking [DOES] so long to take every
7
small step.” After nine months, there had been no substantive
movement on her claim. As far as she could tell, the agency had
not collected any additional evidence, made any findings, or taken
8
any meaningful action. Olivia gave up on the government. With
the help of a pro bono attorney, she settled her claim with Arbalis.
Although she did not recover the damages and penalties she was
9
entitled to, she was happy to just have the experience behind her.
*

*

*

Cora, Earl, and Olivia work in vastly different industries, have divergent skillsets, and run the gamut in age, background, and education. But, as with so many working people, the common thread
that ties together the tapestry of their experiences is wage theft.
Wage theft occurs when an employer denies a worker the wages
10
or benefits to which they are entitled. While wage theft affects
workers of all backgrounds and in every industry, low-wage workers—and especially women, people of color, immigrants, and those
with little formal education—are more susceptible to abuse than
11
others. Common forms of wage theft include not paying the minimum wage, denying overtime, misclassifying employees as independent contractors, and paying workers less than promised. 12 At
best, wage theft reflects a lack of knowledge about the basic mandates of employment law; at worst, it is a casual and callous repudiation of the minimum workplace standards that society has

7. Text Message from Olivia, Non-profit Emp., to author (Jan. 2019) (on file with author).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. KIM BOBO, WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA: WHY MILLIONS OF WORKING AMERICANS ARE
NOT GETTING PAID—AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 7 (2009).
11. DAVID COOPER & TERESA KROEGER, ECON. POL’Y INST., EMPLOYERS STEAL BILLIONS
FROM WORKERS’ PAYCHECKS EACH YEAR 8, 20 (2017).
12. Matthew Fritz-Mauer, Lofty Laws, Broken Promises: Wage Theft and the Degradation of
Low-Wage Workers, 20 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 71, 72–73 (2016).
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deemed necessary. In every instance, it is an unlawful and unacceptable denial of civil rights.
Over the past fifteen years, researchers, activists, commentators,
and politicians have paid a significant amount of attention to this
problem. The picture that emerges is stark. Wage theft is pervasive
and highly impactful. Its most frequent victims are the working
13
poor, who simultaneously need the money the most and are the
14
least able to enforce their rights. It reduces personal incomes by
thousands of dollars per year and collectively costs low-wage workers billions in unpaid earnings. 15
Wage theft’s harms reverberate beyond the individuals who experience it, depriving families, neighborhoods, and entire communities of a shocking amount of money. In doing so, it perpetuates the vicious cycle of poverty, dragging hundreds of thousands
16
of families below the poverty line despite their hard work. The
consequences are significant. Wage theft inflames a range of social
17
problems, as poverty is linked with shorter lifespans, poor
18
19
20
health, eviction, and unsafe neighborhoods. Over time, wage
theft creates a direct barrier to generational economic advancement.
But the harms of wage theft are far more than economic. For
people living on the economic margins of society, who depend on
every dollar in every paycheck just to make ends meet, wage theft
presents a distinct threat to their way of being. Even being denied
a hundred dollars can put a person on the wrong side of hunger,
homelessness, and despair. Beyond that, low-wage workers are
largely aware of their own mistreatment and frequently experience
anger, frustration, and depression because of wage theft. In other
words, Cora, Earl, and Olivia’s stories are not especially egregious,
offensive, or uncommon examples of what America’s low-wage

13. See ANNETTE BERNHARDT, RUTH MILKMAN, NIK THEODORE, DOUGLAS HACKATHORN,
MIRABAI AUER, JAMES DEFILIPPIS, ANA LUZ GONZÁLEZ, VICTOR NARRO, JASON PERELSHTEYN,
DIANA POLSON & MARTIN SPILLER, BROKEN LAWS, UNPROTECTED WORKERS: VIOLATIONS OF
EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAWS IN AMERICA’S CITIES (2009); COOPER & KROEGER, supra note
11, at 8.
14. Fritz-Mauer, supra note 12, at 102–05.
15. BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 13, at 5–6; COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 11, at 1.
16. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 11, at 13–14.
17. Raj Chetty, Michael Stepner, Sarah Abraham, Shelby Lin, Benjamin Scuderi,
Nicholas Turner, Augustin Bergeron, & David Cutler, The Association Between Income and Life
Expectancy in the United States, 2001-2014, 315 JAMA 1750, 1750 (2016); see also Christopher
Mansfield & Lloyd F. Novick, Poverty and Health, 73 N.C. MED. J. 366, 367 (2012).
18. Mansfield & Novick, supra note 17, at 366.
19. MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY (2015).
20. Travis C. Pratt & Francis T. Cullen, Assessing Macro-Level Predictors and Theories of
Crime: A Meta-Analysis, 32 CRIME & JUST. 373, 406 (2005).
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workers experience, but the opposite: Their stories are all too typical.
This increased attention to wage theft has not fallen on deaf
ears. Recently, states and cities have broadly reformed their laws in
21
response to emerging research and social pressure. These legal
reforms commonly enhance civil and criminal penalties for wage
theft, incentivize action by the private bar, expand the enforcement capabilities of government agencies, impose reporting re22
quirements on employers, and provide new avenues for relief.
These changes have been inspiring, timely, and important.
But the central thesis of this Article is that responses to wage
theft, including the actions taken by some of the most progressive
jurisdictions, are fundamentally inadequate. In both passage and
implementation, anti-wage theft policies are broadly predicated on
a misunderstanding of what wage theft is and how it works. The
remedies we create and the ways we administer them are centered
on the idea that wage theft is a personal problem that can be adequately addressed through laws and processes that encourage individuals to take action. It is not, and it cannot be.
This Article argues that wage theft is a social problem that cannot
be meaningfully remedied through an enforcement scheme that
emphasizes private causes of action and passive, complaint-based
administrative processes. Until policymakers understand that wage
theft is a widespread public problem that not only deserves but requires a broad, proactive social response, low-wage workers will continue to have their most basic rights violated—frequently, flagrantly, and to great harm.
This Article explores the problem of wage theft by tracing its
contours, discussing existing solutions, and explaining the failures
of these approaches. Part I defines wage theft and summarizes its
scope and severity. In doing so, I rely on both existing quantitative
research and my own in-depth analysis of wage theft among lowwage workers in the District of Columbia (D.C.). In the wake of
D.C.’s own sweeping statutory reforms, I conducted approximately
60 semi-structured interviews with low-wage workers, workers’
rights activists, employment lawyers, and a small number of employers and government actors. This research provides texture to
the economic realities of wage theft and, for the first time, explores

21. See Marc Doussard & Ahmad Gamal, The Rise of Wage Theft Laws: Can Community–
Labor Coalitions Win Victories in State Houses?, 52 URB. AFFS. REV. 780, 780 (2016); Daniel J.
Galvin, Deterring Wage Theft: Alt-Labor, State Politics, and the Policy Determinants of Minimum
Wage Compliance, 14 PERSP., ON POL. 324, 324 (2016).
22. See Galvin, supra note 21 at 325; D.C. CODE §§ 32-1308, 32-1308.01 (2017).
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the personal and social consequences of basic workplace rights violations.
Part II summarizes how we think about and have responded to
this social problem. We conceive of wage theft as a civil offense, a
personal issue that should be dealt with on an individual, case-bycase basis, much like a dispute over a car accident or a contract.
Both the laws designed to combat wage theft and the actual approach of government actors reflect this thinking. Legal reforms
emphasize private action and individual empowerment, while government agencies have overwhelmingly adopted a passive, lenient,
complaint-based approach to workplace standards enforcement.
Part III explores why current legal reforms and enforcement
strategies are failing. Statutory changes are crucially important.
Standing alone, however, existing countermeasures are inadequate. They are premised on the idea that individual empowerment can present a meaningful response to this social problem,
but this misses the key fact: the vast majority of low-wage workers
who suffer wage theft will never take formal action, so a plan that
overwhelmingly relies on expanding private causes of action is destined to fail. As my research from D.C. shows, even with robust
laws, wage theft still plagues working people.
Finally, Part IV provides a summary of best practices regarding
wage theft. Because this issue is a complex and widespread public
problem, it requires a strategic, thoughtful, and multifaceted social
response. The final section details the requirements of an effective
enforcement scheme, explaining why this approach is necessary.
I. THE SOCIAL HARM OF WAGE THEFT
We typically think about wage theft as a problem that is properly
addressed on an individual basis. To that end, reforms—both as
written and applied—largely focus on empowering aggrieved
workers to bring legal claims and collect unpaid wages and penalties. 23
This section directly challenges this underlying premise through
a review of the practical realities of wage theft. It is not a personal
issue. It is—and must be treated as—a social problem because wage
theft is pervasive and highly impactful. It costs affected workers
24
thousands of dollars per year, undermining society’s most basic
workplace protections. Its harms are not purely economic, howev-

23.
24.

See Galvin, supra note 21, at 325 (discussing various anti-wage theft interventions).
BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 13, at 5; COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 11, at 1.
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er. Frequently, its victims experience devastating cascading harms,
including hunger, homelessness, lasting anger, and deep depression. Even beyond these personal impacts, wage theft broadly hurts
society, siphoning billions from low-income communities and
25
trapping families in the vicious cycle of poverty. It also denies bil26
lions in revenue to the government. Finally, wage theft harms
employers, distorting the labor market and depriving honest businesses of the opportunity to fairly compete.
A. The Economic Costs of Wage Theft
A wealth of quantitative research paints a clear picture: violations of bedrock employment laws are part and parcel of America’s
capitalist economic landscape and cost people and society an extraordinary amount of money.
1. Minimum Wage Violations
Minimum wage violations are significant in both size and scope.
Utilizing broad surveys and large-scale data sets from the Census
Bureau, researchers estimate that roughly seventeen to 26% of low27
wage workers experience minimum wage violations each year.
These abuses are generally significant to individuals and low-wage
workers. A 2009 survey of almost 4,400 low-income people in Los
Angeles, Chicago, and New York City found that almost 60% of
those who experienced minimum wage violations were underpaid
28
by more than $1 per hour. Analyses of Census Bureau data estimate that minimum wage violations cost affected workers about
29
one-quarter of their earnings. In real dollars-and-cents terms, the
average affected low-income person who works year round has
about $3,300 stolen per year, reducing their take-home earnings to
30
only about $10,500. These costs add up; collectively, low-wage

25.
26.

See COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 11, at 1.
FRANÇOISE CARRE, ECON. POL’Y INST., (IN)DEPENDENT CONTRACTOR
MISCLASSIFICATION 2 (2015).
27. See BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 13, at 2 (26% of workers in their sample); COOPER
& KROEGER, supra note 11, at 1 (estimate of 17% of workers); Galvin, supra note 21, at 330
(estimating 16.9% of workers).
28. BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 13, at 2.
29. Galvin, supra note 21, at 331 (finding that minimum wage violations cost affected
workers twenty-three percent of their income, and noting that this is “toward the lower end
of other published estimates”); COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 11, at 36 (noting overall
losses of 23.9% of earned wages).
30. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 11, at 2.
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workers are estimated to lose $15 billion per year to minimum
wage violations alone, artificially placing hundreds of thousands of
31
families below the federal poverty line.
2. Independent Contractor Misclassification
Independent contractor misclassification is one of the most
common and damaging kinds of wage theft. Misclassification occurs in every sector, but it is particularly flagrant where it will be
32
most profitable, like the construction industry, and where the
work is relatively isolated, like the cleaning and trucking indus33
tries.
Nearly all workers in the United States fall into two categories:
employees and independent contractors. Generally speaking, employees labor for a single employer who exercises control over
34
them. The true independent contractor, on the other hand, is
someone with a particular skill who runs their own business, enjoys
35
considerable autonomy, and has a number of clients. Independent contractors, then, do not depend on one particular entity for
their wages, nor are they closely directed and controlled by their
employers. Here is a classic example: servers at a restaurant are
employees, but a plumber who fixes a leaky pipe at the restaurant
is an independent contractor. There is no ongoing relationship,
the restaurant does not control the plumber’s work, and the
36
plumber has expertise.
It is almost always more beneficial to be classified as an employee. Employees are protected by wage and hour laws, have the right
to form unions, enjoy access to workers’ compensation and unem37
ployment insurance, and pay fewer taxes on their earnings. Businesses, in turn, are required to pay a variety of taxes for each of
their employees, including Social Security, Medicare, and unem-

31. Id. at 2–3.
32. The construction industry, for example, has high workers’ compensation premiums, but contractors are able to reduce their costs by as much as 30% percent through misclassification. CARRÉ, supra note 26, at 2.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., WAGE & HOUR DIV., FACT SHEET 13: AM I AN EMPLOYEE?:
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP UNDER THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (FLSA) (2014) (discussing differences between independent contractors and employees).
35. Id.
36. Courts also like to use this example. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct.,
416 P.3d 1, 37 (Cal. 2018) (describing a retail store hiring an outside plumber or an outside
electrician as an example of independent contracting).
37. Fritz-Mauer, supra note 12, at 93–94.
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38

ployment insurance. Additionally, anti-discrimination laws only
39
cover employees.
Businesses often wrongly label their employees as independent
contractors to save money on labor costs. Studies repeatedly find
that at least eleven to 30% of businesses misclassify at least one
40
worker. Overall, there may be several million misclassified work41
ers nationally.
Misclassification is also called payroll fraud because, often, the
42
point is to lie to the government to avoid taxes. These taxes include contributions to the crucial programs that form the social
safety net. Every year, as workers are paid off the books or misclassified, billions of dollars of payroll are never reported to the gov43
ernment. The cost to society is enormous, “robbing unemploy44
ment insurance and workers’ compensation funds of billions.”
And when wrongly-classified workers do attempt to take advantage
of these entitlements—as many eventually do—they are either denied the benefits or else society is forced to absorb the costs.
3. Overtime, Time Shaving, Illegal Deductions, and Tip Stealing
Research on other kinds of wage theft has been much more limited. There are no studies evaluating the rates at which employers
unlawfully deny their employees access to workers’ compensation,
unemployment, and guaranteed sick leave. Nor have there been
studies examining how often employers misclassify their workers as
exempt from minimum wage and overtime protections. For many
kinds of wage theft, the landmark survey of 4,400 low-wage workers
discussed above provides the best—and only—information we have
45
on violation rates. Those findings are summarized in Table 1.1.

38. CARRÉ, supra note 26, at 1–2.
39. Coverage, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers
/coverage.cfm [https://perma.cc/P5YY-GW4B].
40. CARRÉ, supra note 26, at 9.
41. CATHERINE RUCKELSHAUS & CEILIDH GAO, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR MISCLASSIFICATION IMPOSES HUGE COSTS ON WORKERS AND FEDERAL AND
STATE TREASURIES 2 (2017).
42. See MARK ERLICH & TERRY GERSTEIN, CONFRONTING MISCLASSIFICATION AND
PAYROLL FRAUD: A SURVEY OF STATE LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 5 (2019).
43. RUCKELSHAUS & GAO, supra note 41, at 7.
44. Id. at 1.
45. BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 13, at 2–3.
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TABLE 1.1: FINDINGS ON OTHER FORMS OF WAGE THEFT
Form of Wage Theft
Failure to pay overtime
Unpaid off-the clock work
Illegal deductions
Tip stealing

Violation Rate*
76%
70%
41%
12%
* among eligible workers in the week prior to
being surveyed.

B. The Personal Costs of Wage Theft
The overwhelming majority of wage theft research has been
quantitative. As discussed, researchers tend to use large data sets to
analyze and estimate the trends and economic consequences of
various types of wage theft. Although incredibly useful, this body of
research is missing a strong representation of the viewpoints and
experiences of low-wage workers themselves. While the raw statistics are damning, they do not fully describe the texture of the economic and social hardships caused by wage theft.
Over the course of eighteen months, I conducted an in-depth,
qualitative study on wage theft. I focused on wage theft among lowwage workers in the District in the wake of the city passing one of
the most robust and progressive anti-wage theft laws in the coun46
try. One key finding is that wage theft imposes significant personal costs on those who experience it, and these costs are of great
concern. To reiterate, I interviewed approximately 60 people. Most
were low-wage workers (n=33), but I also spoke with policy stakeholders, including workers’ rights activists (n=12), employment
lawyers (n=10), and a small number of employers and government
actors. The takeaway is this: wage theft causes significant harm that
goes beyond the dollars-and-cents of it all and is rarely something
that can simply be absorbed or ignored.
1. Cascading Economic Harms
To grasp the full range of economic harm caused by wage theft,
it is necessary to understand the crime in context. For the low-wage
workers who experience it, wage theft is about more than just an
immediate loss of money. Low-wage workers do not have signifi-

46. See Wage Theft Prevention Amendment Act, 20 D.C. Stat. 4458 (2014) (codified as
D.C. Code § 20-157 (2015)).
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cant savings to fall back on. Most live paycheck to paycheck, making for a tenuous existence, and there is a thin, blurry line between
survival and tragedy.
Being denied payment often cascades into other escalating
harms. If wages are late, short, or entirely unpaid, the whole fragile
scheme holding together a person’s life can be put in jeopardy.
This is because the real experience of being poor does not come
from just one aspect of poverty, like bad housing, food insecurity,
or a lack of healthcare. The essence of poverty lies in how a per48
son’s hardships coalesce, interact, and build upon one another. It
is this interaction that defines the lives of the working poor, and
the danger of wage theft’s overflowing harms is what threatens the
delicate balance of a person’s existence. When the money workers
expect and need suddenly is not there, they are forced to navigate
a maze of hard choices. Making it through becomes a question of
strategy. Who to call? Who to borrow money from? What is the best
approach to take with utility companies, the phone company, and
the landlord? Does rent get prioritized? Heat? Food?
Jonathan Tucker, a DC-area employment lawyer who primarily
represents underpaid immigrants, knows well the problems that his
clients suffer:
[T]he fundamental issue that we’re dealing with, wage
theft, is if people were just paid the wages that they work
[and] that they earn, well, you no longer have a failure to
pay rent, which is what I was dealing with [when I worked]
at Legal Aid. You no longer have credit card debt collection, which is what I was dealing with at Legal Aid, or a
foreclosure case. . . . All these other problems that are gen49
erated by a failure to pay wages are resolved.
According to Jonathan, wage theft lawsuits are “a way to attack the
50
cancer” at the heart of misfortune.

47. This statement is self-obvious, since poor people by definition do not have significant assets. In addition, a 2018 survey by the Federal Reserve found that almost 40% of
adults in this country would not have the money to pay for a hypothetical $400 emergency.
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF U.S.
HOUSEHOLDS IN 2018 2 (2019).
48. See generally DESMOND, supra note 19; DAVID K. SHIPLER, THE WORKING POOR:
INVISIBLE IN AMERICA 11 (2005) (“Isolating the individual problems [of poverty], as a laboratory would extract specific toxins, would be artificial and pointless. They exist largely because of one another, and the chemical reaction among them worsens the overall effect.”).
49. Interview with Jonathan Tucker, Att’y, DCWageLaw, in Washington, D.C. (2018)
(transcript on file with author).
50. Id.
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As Jonathan knows, low-wage workers struggle to meet their
most basic needs when they are not paid properly. Harriet, for example, is a DC government employee who has an acrimonious re51
lationship with her supervisor. On two occasions, the agency she
works for held up her paycheck without explanation, which Har52
riet blames on her supervisor’s animosity. Once, she went unpaid
for several weeks. “I had to make arrangements with the rent,” she
says, her frustration apparent. “[My landlady] was getting tired, because nobody wants to hear that your job is holding your pay.
You’re a government employee! They don’t believe that! So I had
to show proof, you know, that I’ve been begging for money [from
53
my employer].”
This is a common theme. Workers frequently tell of managing
their wage theft by borrowing money to pay for necessities. Often,
they must choose among those necessities, picking between rent
and food, utilities and transportation. Some things are easier to cut
out, like trips to the movies or new clothes. It is far more difficult
to choose among the basic and common requirements of modern
life.
The more severe or chronic the wage theft, the harder it becomes to balance competing obligations. For many, trouble eventually strikes in the form of an unanticipated hardship. While
Ameen was struggling to get his former employer to pay him his
earned wages, for example, he got sick and had to go to the emer54
gency room. This is an expensive stopgap at best, and cost him
55
about $1,500. Manageable if he had been paid the more than
56
$40,000 his former employer owed him. Unmanageable because
he had not. His car was repossessed, and when we met, he was be57
ing evicted.
Eviction is a looming threat in the lives of the working poor, and
researchers increasingly recognize it as a significant social problem. In Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City, sociologist
Matthew Desmond reveals the stark ways in which eviction is both a
58
consequence and a driver of poverty. Poor people struggle with
bills and face homelessness as a result. This threat of homelessness,

51. Telephone Interview with Harriet, Admin. Assistant, D.C. Mun. Gov’t (2018) (transcript on file with author).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Interview with Ameen, Rideshare Driver, in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on
file with author).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. DESMOND, supra note 19, at 295–303
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in turn, leads to a slew of negative outcomes, including joblessness,
59
hunger, trauma, and unstable communities. When working people are denied their earned wages, the threat of eviction—among
others—looms larger and larger over time. Many people, like
60
Ameen, quickly face homelessness after falling behind. Others are
lucky enough to have charitable or understanding landlords, but
patience runs thin over time. Beyond that, the reality of debt and
the prospect of eviction is itself difficult. Carol, for example, is tens
61
of thousands of dollars in debt to her landlord. “What judge do
you think that won’t tell me to get out, and I won’t even give you
62
30 days?” she asks. Like many, the piling bills threaten to overwhelm Carol, and as the next section explains, the strain of such
circumstances is itself harmful.
2. Mental Costs
Most wage theft research discusses its economic consequences.
There are also significant human costs, however. Wage theft presents high economic stakes for the working poor, but it is also personally offensive and can lead to severe emotional and psychological strain.
This is not true for every low-wage worker. But those who do not
express strong negative feelings about their wage theft are typically
unaware of their rights violations. Ashna and Sabbir, for example,
did not know that their former employers had illegally denied
them overtime, thinking instead that this practice simply reflected
63
a lawful business decision. But stories like this present the exception to the rule. Most workers are generally aware, or at some point
64
become aware, of their own mistreatment, and their feelings of
injustice combined with the stress of wage theft’s cascading economic harms elicits powerful reactions.

59. Id.
60. Interview with Ameen, supra note 54.
61. Interview with Carol, Unemployed, in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on file
with author).
62. Id.
63. Interview with Ashna, Low-wage Worker, in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on
file with author); Telephone Interview with Sabbir, House Cleaner (2018) (transcript on file
with author).
64. This is something of a contested point. Research reveals that low-income people—
and Americans in general—do not have a strong understanding of what their rights are.
E.g., Charlotte Alexander & Arthi Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law Enforcement, 89 IND. L.J.
1069, 1093–95 (2014); Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on
Workers’ Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447, 506 (1999). But, broadly speaking, I found
that most eventually do become aware of their rights violations, as discussed in more detail
infra Section III.B.
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Low-wage workers frequently express anger, frustration, and depression over their wage theft. These feelings are understandable.
The situation is defined by their illegal exploitation, directly harms
their financial security, and offers few opportunities for redress.
Miranda, for example, worked for a large department store that
65
frequently shaved time off of her paycheck. She began to track
her hours, and each time she confronted her supervisors, the store
66
admitted its fault and paid her at least some of her money. But
the delay carried costs, and the act itself deeply offended her.
“[There] was one time that my lights almost got turned out,” she
says, clearly frustrated. “I would have to borrow money to pay my
gas or my electric bill, you know, because [my employer] was mess67
ing up! And I told them that, you know? I’ve earned this!”
These expressions of anger are common. “It used to be a saying
about work, how people go postal,” says Kira, who consistently
fights to have her employer follow D.C.’s paid sick days law. “I
68
clearly now understand that meaning . . . .” Kira is not going to
actually attack people, but she is describing the intense frustration
that many feel as a result of having to address pay-related inconsistencies and aggravations that, in their mind, should both not exist and be easily resolved.
These feelings do not just flow from a loss of money. The principle matters. “I’ve been cheated for a long time,” says Will, who discovered that for years his employer had been paying him less than
69
he had been promised. “His refusal to pay has even made it
worse, knowing that he’s wrong. . . . I think I’m more upset be70
cause of his refusal to honor what he’s owed.” Others echo Will’s
thoughts. Being paid late “makes you feel degraded, like you’re
71
72
useless,” Harriet says. “Worthless,” agrees Cora.
As these conversations suggest, many also express a deep sadness
when talking about their experiences with wage theft. Just under
half of the workers I interviewed (16 of 33) expressed feeling depressed, embarrassed, or ashamed over the violations of their
workplace rights, including both their treatment by employers and
their perceived and practical inability to do anything about it. It
65. Interview with Miranda, Dep’t Store Emp., in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript
on file with author).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Interview with Kira, Dep’t Store Emp., in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on
file with author).
69. Interview with Will, Pool Manager, in Oxon Hill, Md. (2018) (transcript on file with
author).
70. Id.
71. Telephone Interview with Harriet, supra note 51.
72. Interview with Cora, supra note 2.
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was upsetting for these people to have to grapple with the reality
that they were being wronged and that there was no easy, clear, or
reliable path to justice.
Wrapped up in work is pride, a sense that a person is a part of
the broader American economic landscape, capable of supporting
themselves and the ones they love. When this is suddenly not the
case, and when it is because of another person’s unlawful acts, the
experience can be deeply upsetting. Caleb’s former employer, for
instance, underpaid him for more than four years, often drastically
73
so. Conservatively, his employer owes him tens of thousands of
dollars. Because of this, he lives with his sister and cannot afford to
buy birthday presents for his grandchildren. “I don’t feel [like] a
74
man,” he says. “I ain’t a grandfather!”
The consequences of wage theft can spiral out of control, as the
confluence of economic insecurity and mental distress drive some
to contemplate suicide. The combined strain of these factors helps
explain why suicide is linked to poverty and periods of economic
75
hardship, and why raising the minimum wage reduces suicide
76
rates. Recall Cora, whose story began this Article. She attempted
to kill herself, and only, at the last moment, diverted from that
77
path and entered into therapy. Like Cora, James—a grocery store
worker—is also in therapy. “I get at the point where I want to kill
myself sometimes, you know?” he says. “It’s really rough. It’s already hard enough, and to have to fight just to get the money
78
[] . . . it’s rough.”
Harriet did not herself attempt suicide, but her father did. He is
sick and moved in with her when her mother died. “My father was
getting depressed because he was worried about me getting fired,
and it was just a mess,” she says. She speaks quickly, clipping her
words with anger. “He would try to commit suicide . . . . [H]e was
79
trying to take pills so he wouldn’t be a burden.”
Although this study has been the first to deeply explore the personal and social consequences of wage theft, these conclusions find
support in others’ research. In studying how well Californians are

73. Interview with Caleb, Unemployed, in Md. (2018) (transcript on file with author).
74. Id.
75. See generally David C. Purselle, Michael Heninger, Randy Hanzlick & Steven J. Garlow, Differential Association of Socioeconomic Status in Ethnic and Age-defined Suicides, 167
PSYCHIATRY RES. 258, 262 (2009).
76. See generally John A. Kaufman, Leslie K. Salas-Hernández, Kelli A. Komro & Melvin
D. Livingston, Effects of Increased Minimum Wages by Unemployment Rate on Suicide in the USA, 74
J. EPIDEMIOLOGY & CMTY. HEALTH 219, 221 (2020).
77. Interview with Cora, supra note 2.
78. Telephone Interview with James, Grocery Store Clerk, in Washington, D.C. (2018)
(transcript on file with author).
79. Telephone Interview with Harriet, supra note 51.
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able to collect on their favorable wage judgments, researchers interviewed low-wage workers who had experienced wage theft and
80
attempted to assert their rights. They reported feeling frustrated,
angry, and depressed over their treatment, the material hardships
caused by wage theft, and the inefficacy of the legal system. One
explained that “[t]here were even days where I had nothing to eat,
and I had to go look for donations to find food for my family,”
81
which “made me feel very depressed.” Another said she “felt upset
and powerless not to collect” the money she earned. 82
In short, although wage theft research has tended to focus on
monetary costs, it also threatens its victims with significant emotional trauma, both because it causes cascading economic consequences and because many of its victims find it personally offensive.
3. Health Consequences
Wage theft also contributes to poor physical health by exacerbating poverty, which has long been linked to negative health outcomes. 83 Researchers estimate that minimum wage violations alone
84
artificially force hundreds of thousands of people into poverty.
Even those victims who do not technically fall below the poverty
line suffer a loss to their economic well-being.
Less money leads to a harder life. Poor people, adults and children alike, are more likely to experience a variety of chronic
health conditions, including diabetes, heart disease, obesity, stress,
85
headaches, and ear infections. Because most of those without
health insurance are poor or near-poor, they are also far less likely
86
to seek treatment.

80. EUNICE HYUNHYE CHO, TIA KOONSE & ANTHONY MISCHEL, NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT,
HOLLOW VICTORIES: THE CRISIS IN COLLECTING UNPAID WAGES FOR CALIFORNIA’S WORKERS
1–2 (2013).
81. Id. at 4.
82. Id.
83. Mansfield & Novick, supra note 17.
84. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 11, at 2, 13–14
85. See Mansfield & Novick, supra note 17, at 366–70; see also Claire Conway, Poor Health:
When Poverty Becomes Disease, U.C.S.F.: NEWS & MEDIA (Jan. 6, 2016),
https://www.ucsf.edu/news/2016/01/401251/poor-health-when-poverty-becomes-disease
[https://perma.cc/89EW-4K46].
86. JENNIFER TOLBERT, KENDAL ORGERA & ANTHONY DAMICO, KEY FACTS ABOUT THE
UNINSURED POPULATION, KAISER FAM. FOUND.: UNINSURED (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.
kff.org/uninsured/issue-brief/key-facts-about-the-uninsured-population [https://perma.cc
/6VCY-VTNK].
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Like eviction and wage theft, poor health both derives from and
87
worsens poverty. Low-income people live in substandard housing,
are exposed to more pollution, have less access to healthy food,
and tend to live more sedentary lifestyles because fewer safe recrea88
tional activities are available. Poor neighborhoods experience
89
more violent crime, which has devastating long-term effects.
Children who grow up in violent communities have lower grades,
90
less interest in school, and do poorly on standardized tests. They
simply do not have the same opportunities to flourish, grow, and
succeed.
These consequences add up and create stark outcomes. On average, “[i]mpoverished adults live seven to eight years less than
those who have incomes four or more times the federal poverty
91
level.” Put simply, the chronic and costly nature of wage theft exacerbates the vicious cycle of poverty, imposing severe costs not just
on immediate victims, but also on their family members, neighbors, and communities.
C. Economic Costs Revisited: Wage Theft, Market Distortion, and
High-Road Employers
Finally, one other group suffers as a result of wage theft: honest
employers. Although the issue is often cast in terms of workers versus employers, this is a limited way to think about it. The fact is,
many people genuinely seek to run law-abiding businesses. But
when they are forced to compete in industries where wage theft is
rampant, the struggle of starting and managing a business becomes
that much more difficult as they find themselves undercut by their
unscrupulous competitors. In many industries, the corrupted nature of the market itself creates a powerful incentive to violate the
law.
Aaron Seyedian is one such legitimate employer. He owns WellPaid Maids, a cleaning service in the D.C. and Boston metropolitan

87.
88.
89.

See DESMOND, supra note 19.
Mansfield & Novick, supra note 17, at 366–67.
ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING
NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 143–48 (2012).
90. Larissa A. Borofsky, Ilana Kellerman, Brian Baucom, Pamella H. Oliver & Gayla
Margolin, Community Violence Exposure and Adolescents’ School Engagement and Academic
Achievement Over Time, 3 PSYCH. VIOLENCE 381, 390–91 (2013); Adam J. Milam, C. Debra FullHolden & Philip J. Leaf, Perceived School and Neighborhood Safety, Neighborhood Violence and Academic Achievement in Urban School Children, 42 URB. REV. 458, 463–65 (2010).
91. Conway, supra note 85. When Conway wrote this article, the federal poverty line was
$11,770 for a single person. Id.
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92

areas. Well-Paid Maids is an anomaly in the home cleaning busi93
ness, which features high wage theft rates. Aaron’s employees
earn $17 an hour, have health care, get 22 paid days off per year,
and have 100% employer-paid short-term disability leave, among
94
other benefits.
“Most of my competitors lack valid business licenses, do not pay
95
sales tax, and misclassify workers,” Aaron says. These illegal practices are very profitable. “Typical margins for a 1099 company in
96
the cleaning industry [are] 40, 45%,” Aaron explains. “Our profit
margin[] oscillates month-to-month. . . . [B]asically, on paper it’s
20%. After emergencies and crises are added in, it’s around 16 or
97
17%.” That is a stunning difference, to say the least. The only reason Aaron has been able to make it work is because he did not take
a salary for the first year he was in business and because he operates only in places where there are enough affluent, social-justice
98
minded people willing to pay his significantly higher rates. “[I]f
you book a weekly cleaning with some other service in D.C., you
can very easily get your one bedroom, one bathroom clean for like
99
$89 each time,” he says. “Whereas from us, it’s going to cost $149
or $139, depending on what time you book, right? So, people see
that and they balk. Not all people, but a substantial contingent of
people, and it’s because they’re used to prices that are set by illegal
100
practices. . . [.]”
There is an important takeaway here. Wage theft is widespread,
101
its victims are rarely able to find vindication, and government en102
forcement is uncommon and inadequate. For employers like Aaron Seyedian, wage theft distorts the competitive market. In many
industries, legal guarantees for workers have become liabilities for
employers who wish to be decent but are torn between the moral
imperative of following basic workplace laws and the realities of
running a business.

92. Interview with Aaron Seyedian, Owner, Well-Paid Maids, in Washington, D.C.
(2018) (transcript on file with author).
93. See CARRÉ, supra note 26, at 2 (noting misclassification is especially prevalent in
housecleaning); BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 13, at 31 (finding 29.5% of maids and housekeepers were paid less than minimum wage the week prior).
94. Interview with Aaron Seyedian, supra note 92.
95. Email from Aaron Seyedian to author (Apr. 19, 2018) (on file with author).
96. Interview with Aaron Seyedian, supra note 92.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., CHO ET AL., supra note 80, at 1–3; Alexander & Prasad, supra note 64, at
1098.
102. See Janice Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards in Partnership with Civil Society: Can CoEnforcement Succeed Where the State Alone Has Failed?, 45 POL. & SOC’Y 359, 360–61 (2017).
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The research presented here illustrates the central thesis of this
Article: wage theft is not an individualized issue, but one that causes
broad and lasting harm to society generally. Violations of our nation’s bedrock employment laws are common and cause significant
financial and emotional harm to workers, high-road employers,
and labor markets in general.
Because wage theft is a broad, multi-faceted social problem, effectively attacking it requires a concerted, social approach. As discussed in the next Part, however, legal interventions generally do
not reflect this idea. Rather than focus on public-driven systemic
change, popular reforms instead attempt to empower individuals.
II. WAGE THEFT REFORMS AND ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES
Over the last fifteen years, activists and workers have mobilized
103
to demand action from elected officials. Because of partisan divides and powerful special interests, federal workplace protections
such as the Fair Labor Standards Act and National Labor Relations
104
Act have atrophied through congressional inaction. Consequently, reformers have turned their energy to state legislatures and
courthouses. In many ways, they have been extremely successful.
States and cities across the country have reformed and updated existing laws to better attack wage theft.
This Part provides an overview of these legal changes and their
implementation. Reforms generally fall into four categories:
1. Laws broadening the definition of “employment”;
2. Laws enhancing civil and criminal penalties;
3. Laws creating or expanding causes of action and avenues
for relief; and
4. Laws imposing more stringent recordkeeping requirements.
In both design and implementation, however, these reforms
largely reflect the common misconception that wage theft is an individual problem that can and should be solved through personal
empowerment and individual mobilization.

103.
104.

See Fritz-Mauer, supra note 12, at 123–26.
JACOB HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS 52–54 (2010).
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A. “Employment” Redefined
The first type of reform broadens the definition of “employment” to empower more people to invoke protective laws. As discussed in Part I, whether a person is classified as an employee or an
independent contractor has an enormous impact on their legal status. Independent contractors pay a higher tax rate and are explicitly exempt from bedrock labor, employment, and anti105
discrimination laws, and cannot access key social safety net pro106
tections.
Whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor
depends on how a jurisdiction defines “employment.” Every jurisdiction has legal tests to analyze this issue. Adding to this confu107
sion, different statutes often have different tests.
One way to address misclassification is to change the legal
standard to more clearly include more workers under the umbrella
of “employee.” In doing so, people gain both legal protections and
the right to sue to enforce those rights.
Most tests analyzing whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor evaluate a number of issues. Common factors
include whether the worker is closely controlled, paid hourly, in a
long-term relationship with the putative employer, and competes
108
in the marketplace. These multi-factor tests can be confusing and
difficult to apply. This creates a significant amount of uncertainty,
and the grey area provides employers with broad opportunities to
(mis)classify workers as independent contractors.
Lately, another test has become increasingly popular. In contrast to traditional analyses, the “ABC Test” is simple. It places the
burden on the employer to prove that a worker is an independent
contractor by showing that they:
A. are free from the employer’s control, both in writing and in
fact;
B. perform work that is outside of the employer’s usual course
of business; and
C. are engaged in an independently established business of
109
their own.

105. See supra Section I.A.2.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Independent Contractor Versus Employee, CAL. DEP’T INDUS. RELS.,
https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/faq_independentcontractor.htm
[https://perma.cc/TTW6MZL8] (discussing applicability of various tests).
108. E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., WAGE & HOUR DIV., supra note 34.
109. Rebecca Smith, Washington State Considers ABC Test for Employee Status, NAT’L EMP. L.
PROJECT (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.nelp.org/blog/washington-state-considers-abc-test-
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This test represents a significant shift. For example, under many
110
analyses, Uber drivers are independent contractors. Under the
111
ABC test, they are almost certainly employees. Because both gig
work and franchising arrangements have become fixtures of the
112
American economy, the ABC test has the potential to drastically
change the nature of work in America.
113
While present in one form or another in many states, the ABC
test shot to prominence in 2018 when the California Supreme
114
Court adopted the test for wage and hour purposes. Then, in
2019, California expanded on this decision by legislatively adopting the ABC test more broadly and applying it to the entire Labor
115
Code with only a few exceptions. Given California’s status as both
116
117
a progressive trendsetter and a large economy, this decision
made waves. Other states are now considering adopting the ABC
118
test in whole or in part, potentially re-classifying millions of peo119
ple.
B. Enhancing Civil and Criminal Penalties
Perhaps the most popular type of reform enhances civil and
criminal penalties for wage theft. This approach relies on the criminological theory of deterrence, reasoning that harsher punish-

employee-status [https://perma.cc/S3L5-N6YS]; see also Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v.
Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 7 (Cal. 2018).
110. E.g., Uber Technologies, Inc. Advice Memorandum from Jayme L. Sophir, Assoc.
Gen. Couns., Div. of Advice, Off. of the Gen. Couns., NLRB, to Jill Coffman, Reg’l Dir., Region 20, NLRB, at 14 (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.laborrelationsupdate.com/files
/2019/05/NLRB-Uber-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZ7L-Y6J3]; U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Wage
& Hour Div., Opinion Letter FLSA 2019-6 (Apr. 29, 2019).
111. Catherine L. Fisk, Those Gig Drivers Aren’t Independent Contractors – They’re Employees,
AM. PROSPECT (May 4, 2018), https://prospect.org/justice/gig-drivers-independentcontractors-employees [https://perma.cc/998Z-KREY]. In the case of Uber drivers, the fact
that the job they perform is the primary work of what Uber does is probably the key factor
that makes them employees.
112. See generally DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE (2014).
113. Smith, supra note 109.
114. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 1.
115. Alexia Fernández Campbell, California Just Passed a Landmark Law to Regulate Uber
and Lyft, VOX (Sept. 18, 2019, 2:13 PM), https://www.vox.com/2019/9/11/20850878/
california-passes-ab5-bill-uber-lyft.
116. See Fritz-Mauer, supra note 12, at 76–94.
117. See California Now Has the World’s 5th Largest Economy, CBS NEWS (May 4, 2018, 6:40
PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/california-now-has-the-worlds-5th-largest-economy/.
118. Smith, supra note 109.
119. In fact, in early 2020, the United States House of Representatives passed the PRO
Act, which incorporates the ABC test into the National Labor Relations Act. Protecting the
Right to Organize Act, H.R. 2474, 116th Cong. § 2(2) (2020).
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120

ments will result in fewer crimes. Jurisdictions frequently allow
workers to recover significant damages on top of unpaid wages and
121
empower the government to impose costly fines and penalties.
122
Many places now also threaten criminal sanctions.
There is good reason to support penalty enhancements. They
compensate aggrieved workers for their added time and effort and
123
can fund government anti-wage theft initiatives. Crucially, penalty enhancements also reduce minimum wage violations. To evaluate the efficacy of different kinds of anti-wage theft laws, political
scientist Daniel Galvin used United States Census Bureau data to
124
analyze minimum wage violations before and after legal reforms.
He found that penalty enhancements do reduce violation rates; in
particular, allowing workers to recover treble (triple) damages
causes a meaningful and statistically significant reduction in mini125
mum wage violations. Other civil and criminal penalty enhance126
ments might also reduce wage theft, but the evidence is weaker.
Crucially, it is not enough to just pass these laws. Actual enforcement matters. If the government signals to employers that it is
not that interested in meaningfully punishing wage theft, then
statutory protections lose much of their power. For example, after
Ohio voters amended the state constitution to allow unpaid workers to collect treble damages, minimum wage violation rates signif127
icantly declined. But when Ohio’s governor issued an executive
order waiving imposition of these penalties for first-time or isolated
128
violations, violation rates returned to their pre-reform levels.
“Enforcement strategies matter” is a common-sense idea, but it
has found empirical support elsewhere as well. Florida has an “unusually high” rate of minimum wage abuse, which researchers at
the Economic Policy Institute attribute in part to the fact that the
129
state got rid of its labor standards enforcement agency in 2002.
When employers have little reason to fear punishment for wage
theft, they are emboldened to steal from their workers.

120. For an overview of deterrence theory, see RONALD L. AKERS, CHRISTINE S. SELLERS &
WESLEY G. JENNINGS, CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORIES 15–34 (7th ed. 2012).
121. See Galvin, supra note 21, at 329.
122. Id.
123. E.g., D.C. CODE § 32-1307.01(a), 01(b) (2017).
124. Galvin, supra note 21, at 330.
125. Id. at 339.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 340.
128. Id.
129. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 11, at 12.
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C. Expanding Avenues for Relief
While unpaid employees have always had the power to sue to enforce their rights in court, this is far easier said than done. The civil
justice system is hard to navigate for the vast majority of people. In
particular, low-wage workers do not have legal training, familiarity
130
with the civil justice system, or the ability to hire a lawyer. Even if
a person does gather the resources to file a lawsuit, they are usually
outmatched by their employers, who tend to have more economic
and social power and, therefore, greater access to key resources
like time, knowledge, and legal representation.
In an effort to address this imbalance, reforms attempt to make
it easier to take formal action. This approach includes both expanding administrative paths to legal action and incentivizing attorneys to take on wage theft cases.
Many states (and some large cities) have local equivalents of the
federal Department of Labor (DOL) that monitor employment
131
and enforce workplace laws. Across the country, workers are increasingly able to file legal complaints with these agencies, which
132
may then investigate claims, hold hearings, and issue judgments.
In practice, however, the power and efficacy of these agencies varies widely. The D.C. DOES, for example, may investigate all allegations of wage theft and retaliation and order the same remedies as
a court, including fines, liquidated damages, attorney’s fees, and
133
injunctions. In contrast, Colorado’s Department of Labor and
134
Employment may only investigate claims worth $7,500 or less.
Workers can also sue their employers in small claims court, alt135
hough there are upper limits on the value of such cases. This is
not a heavily-studied forum for addressing wage theft, but recently
some scholars have begun to urge reforms to streamline and en136
courage unpaid wage claims.
In theory, at least, these alternative paths should provide people
with an easy, fast, and accessible avenue for rights enforcement. In

130. See Fritz-Mauer, supra note 12, at 102–03.
131. See Marianne Levine, Behind the Minimum Wage Fight, a Sweeping Failure to Enforce the
Law, POLITICO (Feb. 18, 2018, 10:40 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/02/18/
minimum-wage-not-enforced-investigation-409644.
132. See, e.g., Fritz-Mauer, supra note 12, at 103 (discussing administrative hearings in
California); D.C. CODE § 32-1308.01 (2017).
133. D.C. CODE § 32-1308.01 (2017).
134. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-4-111(1)(a) (2014).
135. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 116.220(1) (Deering 2010) (establishing a $5,000
limit); D.C. CODE § 11-1321 (2016) (establishing a $10,000 limit).
136. E.g., Llezlie Green, Wage Theft in Lawless Courts, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1303 (2019).
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practice, most low-wage workers are unsure where to even begin.
138
Many also lack the confidence to act.
Finally, the District has had some success experimenting with
generous attorney’s fees as a way to induce lawyers to take on wage
theft suits. While successful plaintiffs have long been entitled to re139
cover fees and costs under the Fair Labor Standards Act, the District’s Wage Theft Prevention Amendment Act of 2014 enshrined
140
high hourly rates for attorneys. For example, attorneys with up to
three years of experience have a statutory rate of almost $375 per
hour. 141
According to worker-side employment lawyers in the D.C. area,
this fee-shifting provision has expanded access to legal representation by making a broader range of cases financially feasible. As Michael Amster, a partner at a local employment law firm, explains,
the law “allow[s] us to take cases that we otherwise wouldn’t take. It
allows us to be able to justify taking smaller cases . . . . Because
frankly, in a lot of these cases you’re dealing with people who are
making very little money and sometimes what is owed to them is
142
not that much.” Those smaller cases are now more viable because
the law has created a higher return for lawyers.
High hourly rates can only help so many people obtain representation, because private attorneys are unwilling to take on claims
with an uncertain payday. There are two main reasons why somebody with a strong wage theft claim will nevertheless be unable to
find an attorney. First, many low-wage workers toil for fly-by-night
employers who operate on the margins of the system. They regularly skirt labor laws and have few assets, and because of this, they
143
are hard to nail down and collect money from.
Second, most wage claims are still just too small. Two attorneys
privately told me that they refuse to take on clients whose unpaid
wages are less than $10,000, a high threshold for workers to meet.
The reason this matters is because fee-shifting provisions allow victorious plaintiffs to recover “reasonable” attorney’s fees; this means
137. See Alexander & Prasad, supra note 64, at 1095.
138. Id. at 1073 (discussing retaliation and a lack of belief in the efficacy of making a
claim); Shannon Gleeson, Brokered Pathways to Justice and Cracks in the Law: A Closer Look At the
Claims-Making Experiences of Low-Wage Workers, 18 WORKINGUSA 77, 90–93 (2015).
139. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
140. D.C. CODE §§ 32-1308(b)(1), 32-1308.01(m)(1) (2017) (establishing that successful
plaintiffs’ attorneys are entitled to fees calculated “pursuant to the matrix approved in Salazar v. District of Columbia, 123 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 2000)). This matrix is also referred to as
the Laffey Matrix. See LAFFEY MATRIX, http://www.laffeymatrix.com/see.html (last visited
Jan. 18, 2021).
141. LAFFEY MATRIX, supra note 140.
142. Interview with Michael Amster, Partner, Zipin, Amster & Greenberg, LLC, in Silver
Spring, Md. (2018) (transcript on file with author).
143. See CHO ET AL., supra note 80, at 10–11.
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that such fees are usually proportionally related to the value of the
underlying claim. In reality, most low-wage workers cannot reach
these implied threshold requirements to obtain representation.
D. Recordkeeping Requirements
Finally, anti-wage theft laws often impose new or more stringent
144
recordkeeping and transparency requirements on employers.
This places the burden on the party with the best ability to preserve
the kind of evidence (e.g. paychecks) that is crucial to determining
whether wage and hour laws were violated. Typically, employers
are subject to fines and penalties for not keeping accurate rec145
ords. In some cases, a failure to preserve records reduces the
burden of proof for plaintiffs, making it easier to win wage
146
claims.
In addition, new laws require employers to provide key information in writing to new hires, including the legal name of the
147
employer, rate of pay, and regular payday. Finally, many states
empower government agencies to proactively investigate wage theft
allegations, requiring employers to make their records available for
148
investigators to review. Although this right is limited to some ex149
tent by the Fourth Amendment, it still has the potential to be a
powerful enforcement tool.
E. The Realities of Wage Theft Enforcement
This collection of reforms reflects the current gold standard for
anti-wage theft laws. On paper, they fairly compensate workers,
significantly sanction employers, and smooth the legal process by
creating new ways to bring claims, incentivize representation, and
ensure the preservation of evidence. These laws also make the government a more active participant in the employment relationship
by meaningfully enhancing the power of administrative agencies
and prosecutors.
In practice, though, these powers go unused.
144. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 32-1306(d)(1) (2018); see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 226(a) (2018).
145. Lori P. Benton, An Employer’s Duty to Preserve Documents Beyond the FLSA’s Record Keeping Requirements, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.
aspx?g=474cd2c1-f251-4cb8-9267-d3500e63ceeb [https://perma.cc/8RLH-QHM7].
146. E.g., Furry v. East Bay Publ’g, 30 Cal. App. 5th 1072, 1078-80 (2018); Holaway v.
Stratasys, Inc., 771 F.3d 1057, 1059 (8th Cir. 2014).
147. E.g., D.C. CODE § 32-1008(c) (2018).
148. E.g., D.C. CODE § 32-1331.05(a) (2013); CAL. LAB. CODE § 90 (1984).
149. City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2451–54 (2015).
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Criminal penalty enhancements, for example, draw upon the
150
belief that we should treat wage theft like “regular” theft. These
reforms satisfy a visceral sense of justice and have made some waves
in popular media, but they are largely hollow because few prosecu151
tors pursue criminal sanctions. Nationally, the Fair Labor Standards Act has criminalized “willful” minimum wage and overtime vi152
olations for decades. In some parts of the country, wage theft has
153
long been a criminal offense under state law. And yet, prosecu154
tion is and always has been extremely rare.
Likewise, very few labor standards enforcement agencies actually
invoke their mandates by engaging in proactive investigations. Instead, the vast majority rely on a passive, complaint-based approach
to enforcement. They wait for workers to come forward with complaints and then work to bring a particular employer into compli155
ance.
Part of the problem stems from the government not investing
enough resources in these agencies. The DOL, for instance, had as
many wage and hour investigators in 2014 as in 1948, despite the
156
fact that the agency now covers a workforce six times the size.
Many state agencies are even worse off. Six states have no labor
standards enforcement agency and 26 have fewer than 10 investi157
gators. And these weaknesses show. A 2009 audit by the Government Accountability Office found significant flaws in the DOL’s
complaint process, including “delays in investigating complaints,
complaints not recorded in the WHD database, failure to use all
available enforcement tools because of a lack of resources, failure
to follow up on employers who agreed to pay, and a poor com158
plaint intake process.” Similar problems exist even in progressive
159
bastions.
But a lack of resources is not the only reason why the government fails to utilize the tools available to it. Agencies’ passive, waitand-see approach to wage theft enforcement reflects the broader
social belief that wage theft is, fundamentally, a personal problem.

150. Fritz-Mauer, supra note 12, at 93.
151. Id. at 118.
152. 29 U.S.C. § 216(a).
153. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 484(a) (2014); 1913 Cal. Stat. 636.
154. See NAT’L EMP. L. PROJECT, Winning Wage Justice: An Advocate’s Guide to State and City
Policies to Fight Wage Theft (2011); Fritz-Mauer, supra note 12, at 118.
155. Fine, supra note 102, at 361.
156. Galvin, supra note 21, at 325.
157. Levine, supra note 131.
158. GREGORY D. KUTZ & JONATHAN T. MEYER, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., WAGE & HOUR
DIVISION’S COMPLAINT INTAKE AND INVESTIGATIVE PROCESSES LEAVE LOW WAGE WORKERS
VULNERABLE TO WAGE THEFT 4 (2009).
159. E.g., CHO ET AL., supra note 80, at 4.
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Many government actors are unwilling to act proactively and aggressively because doing so would upset the status quo and run
160
contrary to broadly-held beliefs about wage theft.
The above reforms, while able to make some difference, are
premised on the belief that empowering individuals is an effective
way to broadly attack this social problem and achieve justice for
low-wage workers. As the next section illustrates, this belief is entirely wrong.
III. BARRIERS TO ACTION AND THE FAILURES OF REFORM
For almost a year, Maynor worked at Eastern Flavors, a midrange restaurant in the District. 161 As with many restaurants,
162
though, the attractive exterior gilded ugly inner truths. Maynor’s
employers only paid him about half of the minimum wage, and he
never got overtime despite working up to 70 hours a week. When
Maynor eventually complained about the conditions, they fired
him. “They even tried to fight me when I left,” he says. “They threw
soy sauce at me.”
Some of Maynor’s friends told him about an attorney they trusted. When Maynor went to talk to this lawyer, he realized just how
badly he had been mistreated. Over the course of the year, Eastern
Flavors underpaid Maynor by about $25,000—money he sorely
needed to support himself and his family in one of the most ex163
pensive places in the country.
Maynor and two of his former co-workers sued. Eastern Flavors
refused to settle, and the case went to a four-day trial. Maynor and
his friends prevailed, and the judge ordered the restaurant to pay
164
them more than $150,000, plus attorney’s fees. Maynor alone
won almost $100,000, an extraordinary amount of money for a

160. For a more detailed discussion of this mindset, see infra Section IV.C.5.
161. Interview with Maynor, Line Chef, Washington D.C. (2018) (transcript on file with
author).
162. Studies consistently find that wage theft is common in the food service industry. See,
e.g., BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 13, at 31; Galvin, supra note 21, at 331 (finding a 22%
violation rate for food services and drinking place industries).
163. To compare costs of living between different places, economists rank states and cities based on their “Regional Price Parities,” or RPPs. These RPPs measures the differences in
prices across state and city lines, and the analysis covers all consumption goods and services,
including rent. The Bureau of Economic Analysis determined that in 2017, D.C. had the
second highest RPP in the country. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, BEA 19-21, REAL PERSONAL
INCOME FOR STATES AND METROPOLITAN AREAS, 2017 (2019), https://www.bea.gov/news
/2019/real-personal-income-states-and-metropolitan-areas-2017 [https://perma.cc/F9LUNWCJ].
164. I verified these numbers, but I have not cited those sources to preserve Maynor’s
anonymity.
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man who had been making $5 an hour just a year earlier. When we
spoke more than fifteen months later, Maynor had only recovered
a third of this judgment. This was still enough to change his life,
and he and his attorneys were preparing to place a lien on his former employer’s property to recover the rest.
Maynor speaks glowingly of his lawyers and the process. “It’s an
example for everyone because so many people are afraid to go talk
to a lawyer,” he says. “And so they just suffer, and they suffer. They
live in fear with their arms crossed, but afterwards I felt really good
because the law is the law, and what’s correct is correct.”
*

*

*

Maynor’s story is the one we like to tell. It represents the best
that anti-wage theft reforms have to offer. It is inspiring, a Davidand-Goliath tale of hardship, struggle, and vindication. Maynor’s
employers violated his basic rights and exploited his vulnerabilities,
and he was abused even beyond the basic degradation inherent in
wage theft. But through dedication and courage, he brought to
bear the full weight of the law and found justice. In the end, it did
not matter that Maynor speaks almost no English, has little money,
is almost certainly undocumented, dropped out of school in the
second-grade, and has no legal knowledge. Because of the District’s’s recent anti-wage theft reforms, he received compensation
not only for his lost wages, but for the trouble he had to go
through to get them, and he did not have to pay any money for the
outcome. Maynor simply reached out, placed his hands on the levers of power that the law made available, and walked away much
better for it.
This tale fits neatly into the belief that private legal remedies can
effectively solve social problems. But this story is also extremely rare, the strong exception to a stark truth: under the current system,
the overwhelming majority of low-wage people who experience
wage theft have no real avenues for recourse.
The reforms discussed in Part II have been broadly accompanied by a sense of accomplishment among those who pass them. In
some ways, this feeling is well-deserved. This new wave of laws reflects an earnest desire to address wage theft, to grant working
people the tools they need to enforce their own rights, and to create fair and dignified workplaces. When invoked and enforced, anti-wage theft reforms upend the age-old power dynamic and provide aggrieved workers with a real path to redress.
But there is a crippling problem with an approach that depends—and in fact requires—low-wage workers to drive enforcement. The fact is, low-wage workers overwhelmingly lack—or at
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least believe they lack—the practical ability to hold their employers
accountable for violations of their rights. As this Part explains, an
enforcement regime based on the misconception that individual
empowerment is an acceptable way to address a problem like wage
theft is fundamentally flawed because the vast majority of low-wage
workers do not take formal legal action over their rights violations.
There is no question that the statutory reforms discussed in Part II
are important. But, as long as remedies emphasize personal empowerment and a complaint-based approach to enforcement, they
will fail, afflicting little more than a surface-level attack on the
problem.
A. Wage Theft, Disputing, and the Safe Path of Silence
To fully grasp why the standard approach to fighting wage theft
is destined to fail, it is crucial to understand when, why, and how
people take action over their own mistreatment. Or, in this case,
why so many do not.
Sociolegal scholars who study the civil justice system have spent a
great deal of time analyzing the process through which people
“name,” “blame,” and “claim”—that is, when and how people recognize an injury (name), assign responsibility (blame), and take
165
action (claim). This research has revealed that there are many
166
potential legal disputes that people never act upon.
Disputes are social constructs. Whether a given situation will
evolve into a legal claim depends heavily on social context and per167
sonal understandings. An extensive body of research on disputing shows that the ability and willingness to name a problem,
blame somebody for it, and bring a claim depends heavily on who
168
somebody is and how their thinking has been influenced. As sociologist Rebecca Sandefur explains, “studies frequently . . . reveal
powerful influences of local social context on how disputes are un169
derstood and pursued.”
This “local social context” can greatly impact how a person
thinks about and responds to their experiences. Many factors mat165. See, e.g., KITTY CALAVITA & VALERIE JENNESS, APPEALING TO JUSTICE: PRISONER
GRIEVANCES, RIGHTS, AND CARCERAL LOGIC (2015); Catherine Albiston, Lauren B. Edelman
& Joy Milligan, The Dispute Tree and the Legal Forest, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 105 (2014);
William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of
Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming, 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 631 (1981).
166. Albiston et al., supra note 165, at 106.
167. See id. at 114–17.
168. See id.
169. Rebecca Sandefur, Access to Civil Justice and Race, Class, and Gender Inequality, 34 ANN.
REV. SOC. 339, 342 (2008).
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ter, including widespread cultural beliefs, a person’s own back170
ground and upbringing, socioeconomic status, and race. Also
important are “agents of transformation”—people and organizations, including nonprofits, friends, and government officials, who
171
shape, guide, and manage beliefs and expectations.
This analysis really boils down to questions of power and influence. If a person who is wronged has more social power and resources and has been encouraged to think about an experience as
a legal problem, then they are more likely to take action. Members
of groups that are lower in the social hierarchy (like poor people,
those without much formal education, and minorities) perceive
172
fewer problems and make fewer claims. For example, we would
expect an upper-class white person whose mother is a lawyer to be
more likely to file a lawsuit or administrative complaint than a lowincome person of color who does not know any attorneys. To some
extent, this divergence is about resources and the kinds of problems people have. Wealthier people are better equipped to pursue
legal action and are also more likely to have disputes with higher
stakes. But these factors do not fully explain the entire relationship
between class position and action. Lower-income people are also
less likely to pursue disputes because of a general sense of power173
lessness and a lack of faith in the system.
Wage theft represents a potential dispute, which workers may
recognize (name), assign responsibility for (blame), and pursue
through a variety of formal and informal processes (claim). In light
of the attention that wage theft has received, we might expect lowwage workers to regularly take legal action over their pay-based
rights violations. After all, there has been a growing social movement dedicated to empowering these people, both legally and personally, and the interventions discussed in Part II of this Article
have been designed for just that purpose.
But this is far from the case. Overwhelmingly, people who suffer
174
wage theft do not take any legal action. Despite the harm of the
crime and its (often flagrant) illegality, almost no low-wage workers
step forward.
Unlike some other potential disputes—e.g., a faulty product involving multiple potential responsible parties—”blaming” for wage
theft is straightforward. People understand that their employers

170. For an empirical discussion of these various factors, see generally Albiston et al.,
supra note 165.
171. See id. at 106.
172. Id. at 124; Sandefur, supra note 169, at 346.
173. See Sandefur, supra note 169, at 347.
174. See Alexander & Prasad, supra note 64, at 1089.
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are responsible for paying, or not paying, their wages. Instead, the
real problems for disputing wage theft arise at the “naming” and
“claiming” phases.
B. Naming Wage Theft
Naming an act of wage theft as an injury is a crucial first step to
action. Before a person will assert their rights, they must understand what those rights are and how they have been violated. A
wealth of empirical research supports the idea that “inaccurate or
incomplete knowledge of the law can limit one’s willingness and
175
ability to assert their rights.” For example, in her study of the
Family and Medical Leave Act, sociolegal scholar Catherine Albiston found that people who had basic information about their
176
rights felt more empowered. Rights awareness itself provided
177
workers with both a legal and moral justification for speaking up.
Research concludes that many low-wage workers do not have a
clear understanding of their workplace rights. One analysis found
that almost 60% “misunderstood their minimum wage and overtime rights,” with people frequently overestimating and underes178
timating the applicable minimum wage. Significant gaps in understanding exist even among undocumented workers, for whom
law is particularly salient and who are frequently the targets of
179
know-your-rights outreach efforts. A survey of day laborers determined that 45% did not know the applicable minimum wage
and 21% did not realize it is illegal to pay less than minimum wage.
180
Fewer than half knew both of these facts.
Confusion over substantive rights commonly arises in conversations with low-wage workers. Jack, for example, has been embroiled
in a dispute with his former employer, a large and successful res181
taurant. Jack played two roles, working as both a server and a caterer. “In catering I was probably putting in about 20 hours a
week,” he explains, and “[w]ith the waiting tables I was probably

175. Mary Nell Trautner, Erin Hatton & Kelly E. Smith, What Workers Want Depends: Legal
Knowledge and the Desire for Workplace Change Among Day Laborers, 35 L. & POL’Y 319, 320
(2013).
176. See Catherine Albiston, Bargaining in the Shadow of Social Institutions: Competing Discourses and Social Change in Workplace Mobilization of Civil Rights, 39 L. & SOC’Y REV. 11, 13–14
(2005).
177. Id. at 28–29.
178. Alexander & Prasad, supra note 64, at 1072.
179. See id. at 1093–95.
180. Trautner et al., supra note 175, at 330–31.
181. Interview with Jack, Artist & Server, in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on file
with author).
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182

putting in 30 hours a week.” Separately, that is. Working 50
hours a week for a single employer means that Jack should have
been paid for ten hours of overtime. He was not, but Jack did not
realize that this was illegal. Instead, he viewed his two roles as independent of one another, even though both his basic job duties
183
and his employer stayed the same. As a result, he never pursued a
claim for unpaid overtime.
Not knowing the law is not the only barrier to naming. Workers
must also understand that their particular situations are illegal.
Even some who know their rights fail to realize that their own experiences constitute mistreatment. It is not easy or convenient for
people to track their hours, check their own records against their
paystubs, and do the weekly math required to verify that they are
184
being paid correctly.
In short, lack of knowledge is a significant problem in a system
reliant on worker complaints. But there is also a great deal of nuance missing from this discussion. Despite the research presented
here, it is also the case that—at least in D.C.—low-wage workers are
largely aware of their own wage theft. This might sound contradictory. How can a group of people with poor knowledge of their
rights also be generally aware of their own mistreatment? The answer lies in the fact that wage theft is usually nothing more than a
violation of a person’s most basic entitlements. Although “wage
theft” is an umbrella term that covers many different offenses, the
most common forms violate our country’s oldest and most rudi185
mentary workplace laws. These laws are longstanding and also
coincide with our own cultural and moral understandings of how
things should be. In other words, it does not take much knowledge
to understand the wrongness of the broad range of violations that
low-income people suffer. Beyond that, even if workers do not immediately identify that their rights are being violated, they often
become aware after the fact.
Most of the time, then, the real barrier to action is not a lack of
knowledge, especially in a place as progressive and socially active as
D.C., where there are many sources of information available to
teach people about their rights, including radio and bus advertisements, non-profit and advocacy organizations, and friends and
coworkers. Even as the details of these laws escape workers, who
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. This is especially true for tipped workers, who have to deal with the added difficulty
of tracking their tips. Tips are usually a mix of cash and credit and often come in on a delay,
which makes it hard to line them up with particular paychecks and workweeks.
185. See, for example, Fritz-Mauer, supra note 12, at 78–82, for a discussion of the inception of minimum wage and overtime laws.
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sometimes misstate the applicable minimum wage or fail to understand how quickly they accrue paid sick days, most people who
have been cheated eventually learn of it.
This discussion raises questions. People who experience wage
theft are deeply affected by it. In many places, like the District,
there are also powerful, pro-worker laws designed to ease the path
to civil justice, send a powerful message about the wrongness of
wage theft, and provide redress. And yet, working people do not
take formal legal action. They do not pursue the remedies enshrined in law. Across the board, complaint rates are extremely
186
low. One study found that almost 98% of workers who perceive
workplace rights violations (consisting mainly of wage theft) do not
187
pursue their claims through the civil justice system. Why? In the
age of an ascendant left-wing in Democratic politics with growing
pro-worker grassroots movements, economic inequality and the
experiences of working people are the focus of a national conversation, and this attention has resulted in sweeping reforms. So why,
then, do workers fail to take action? As the next section explains,
the real barriers to individualized enforcement arise at the claiming phase.
C. Barriers to Claiming: Retaliation, Lack of Confidence, and
Power Dynamics
The majority of low-wage workers who name their legal injuries
give up at the claiming phase. During the claiming phase, a worker
confronts the person or entity who they blame for their wage theft
188
and demands a remedy. Claiming can take a variety of forms and
includes everything from talking to a supervisor to filing a law189
suit.
Analyzing data from the 2008 survey of 4,400 low-wage workers,
Charlotte Alexander and Arthi Prasad concluded that only 57% of
those who felt their rights had been violated at work made any

186. David Weil, Creating a Strategic Enforcement Approach to Wage Theft: One Academic’s
Journey in Organizational Change, 60 J. INDUS. REL. 1, 8 (2018); David Weil & Amanda Pyles,
Why Complain-Complaints, Compliance, and the Problem of Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 27
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 59, 69 (2005).
187. See Alexander & Prasad, supra note 64, at 1085–86, 1089. Although the authors did
not do this math themselves, it is straightforward: Out of 4,387 workers total, 33% perceived
rights violations, 57% of those made a claim of any kind, and 4% of those who made a claim
did so formally. (4387) x (.33) x (.57) x (.04) = 33 workers who made a formal claim out of
1,447 who perceived rights violations, yielding a formal complaint rate of about 2.3%.
188. Albiston et al., supra note 165, at 106.
189. Id. at 106–09.
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190

kind of claim in the year prior to the survey. Of those who did
191
speak up, 96% did so informally by speaking to their employers.
Only four percent of those who made claims, then, tried to take
the kind of formal legal action envisioned by the reforms discussed
in Part II. Parsed out, this means that of all the low-income workers
in the survey who believed their employers broke the law, only
about two percent went to the government or a private attorney for
help. 192
There are three significant “barriers to claiming” that effectively
prevent low-income people from taking legal action. Working people frequently report that what stops them from really pursuing
rights enforcement is: 1) fear of retaliation; 2) concern about navigating the system successfully; and 3) a lack of personal power and
faith in the government.
These barriers to claiming are not mutually exclusive but overlapping. Fearing retaliation, for example, is inherently linked to a
perceived lack of power and faith in government. After all, if a person believed they had the power to enforce their own rights, or
had confidence that the government could and would protect
them, they would not be afraid of employer reprisal. What these
issues, discussed in more detail below, have in common is that they
are all inextricably tied to workers’ low positions on the social and
economic hierarchies that structure society.
1. Fear of Retaliation
The biggest explanation for why low-wage workers do not attempt to assert their rights, either at all or to a significant degree, is
193
because they are afraid of retaliation. Retaliation can take many
forms. Supervisors bully and intimidate workers who complain, cut
their hours, adjust their schedules without warning, contact immigration authorities, and find excuses to terminate, suspend, or
otherwise discipline them.
While all retaliation is intimidating and unpleasant, the worst—
and most effective—is the kind that reduces earnings. Especially
for those who live in poverty or just on the edge of it, income is an

190. Alexander & Prasad, supra note 64, at 1084.
191. Id. at 1089.
192. This statistic worsens once one accounts for the fact that some people fail to understand when their employers violate their rights. Given that many low-wage workers lack
rights knowledge, the best empirical evidence suggests that far fewer than 2% of those who
suffer wage theft take formal legal action over it.
193. The problems with retaliation are well-documented, as are workers’ concerns. See
supra note 138.
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overriding concern. Low-wage workers have little—if anything—in
194
the way of savings, and, as discussed in Part I, even a temporary
loss of income can have a devastating impact on a person’s way of
life. Many times, even a bad employer who steals wages is better
than no employer and the looming prospect of debt, hunger, and
homelessness.
Workers, wage theft attorneys, and workers’ rights activists well
understand these facts. Joanna Blotner, an advocate at Jews United
for Justice in Washington, D.C., speaks for many when she explains
that
for most people, the most important thing is keeping whatever the bare minimum income is, keeping that job. It’s
much worse to be out of a job and start that search process
over again and scramble for income in the in-between. . . .
Losing a job is almost guaranteed losing housing, losing
whatever other supports and bills you’ve got to pay in your
195
life.
Fear of retaliation reflects the power imbalance inherent in employer-employee relationships and is also justified by data. Approximately 43% of respondents in the landmark study of 4,400 lowwage workers reported suffering employer retaliation as a result of
196
their most recent workplace-related claim. Many workers in the
District also speak at length about their experiences with retaliation and how they have learned that enduring wage theft can cost
less than fighting it. In total, just under half of my respondents expressed being afraid of retaliation.
Ruben, for example, was used to long hours at the Homeless
197
Youth Retreat, a non-profit organization. A large, cheerful man,
he speaks passionately about the mission of the organization and
his willingness to put forth time and effort. “[W]ithin a two-week
period, I was knocking out hours, like 88, 96, 104, 112,” he says. “I
198
was crushin’ ‘em!” Ruben, however, earned the same rate for
199
every hour he worked, no overtime, even though he was not exempt. At first, he tried to talk to his supervisors about it. “Fuck

194. Supra note 47.
195. Interview with Joanna Blotner, Legis. Dir., D.C. Fam. & Econ. Sec. Campaigns, Jews
United for Just., in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on file with author).
196. Alexander & Prasad, supra note 64, at 1073.
197. Interview with Ruben, Security Guard & Couns., in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on file with author).
198. Id.
199. Id.
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you,” one of them told him. “We not paying you, man. You lucky
200
we paying you that!”
For many, this would have been the end of it. But Ruben could
not let it go. He is college-educated, a veteran, and he knew he was
right. He filed a wage claim with the D.C. DOES, which eventually
determined that his employer owed him about a thousand dollars,
201
plus penalties. After some negotiations mediated by the agency,
202
Ruben walked away with about $2,500 before taxes.
That was still not the end of his saga, though. “[N]ow that all the
smoke has cleared, I’m not getting more hours,” Ruben says. 203 He
has gone from working more than 80 hours every two weeks to only a single shift. “I want to play it off, but one day?” Ruben asks, incredulous. “Just one day? I got scheduled two days a month? I’ve
been with you more than fifteen years and that’s all I get called
for? Is this retaliation behind me going to court?” Ruben does not
think he can prove it, but he got the message: “I don’t argue no
204
more. I stopped arguing.”
Others have similar stories. James, a grocery store employee, noticed his paychecks were missing hours. He spoke up multiple
times, and although his employer repeatedly paid him back, his
supervisors became increasingly hostile. They cut his hours; transferred him to a store far from his home; and cooked up reasons to
yell at, abuse, and punish him. “I’m almost afraid to ask for my
money, and it shouldn’t be like that!” he says, his frustration plain.
Would he speak up again? “[I]t does discourage you. . . . I got my
check that’s coming up next week, it’s going to be messed up . . . .
205
And I’m not going to say anything. I’m going to leave it alone.”
Retaliating against a single outspoken employee can have a
powerful ripple effect. Targets get the message, but so too do their
coworkers. Like James, Miranda’s employer began to cut her hours
206
after she complained that her paycheck was short. Some of her
coworkers wanted to take action over the same problem but ultimately did not. “[T]hey was scared of the backlash,” Miranda ex207
plains, “[like] how they shortened my hours.”
We think of low-wage jobs as ubiquitous and therefore easy to
find because they require few skills, have a high turnover rate, and

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Telephone Interview with James, supra note 78.
Interview with Miranda, supra note 65.
Id.
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208

there is a low barrier to entry. This way of thinking implicitly assumes that if a worker loses their job, they can easily find another
similar one. Broadly speaking, this might be true. It might be the
case that in the aggregate, low-wage people are able to find new
jobs relatively quickly. But the interim between leaving one job and
starting a new one is frightening, even if it only lasts a week or two,
and many report that economic insecurity buys silence. Marcos, for
instance, spent years working as a dishwasher, and explains that
although he felt “terrible” about his wage theft, he had to put up
209
with it because he “didn’t know where else to look for work.”
This generalized fear worsens when people have particular
points of vulnerability that leave them especially open to exploitation. Being older, having dependents, or having a criminal conviction are all the kinds of qualities that make a person particularly
vulnerable. Marion, for example, was convicted of a sex offense
210
and also struggles to support her son. “It’s hard because I have a
record now, and sometimes I don’t get [interviews], sometimes I
get interviews that go well, sometimes they be like ‘I can’t hire you
211
because of your background.’ “ At her last job, Marion was not
exempt from overtime under either D.C or federal law, but her
employer only paid her for 40 hours a week, even though she
212
worked about 60. She sometimes went hungry and often had to
213
scrounge or borrow bus money so she could go to work. Although Marion knew she could file a complaint with the D.C.
DOES, she did not. “I was like, ‘I’ll take the experience because I
214
need it on my resume,’ “ she explains.
Perhaps the biggest inflection point for worker exploitation is
immigration status, which helps explain why foreign-born workers
215
are especially susceptible to wage theft. In Wage Theft in America,
author and activist Kim Bobo discusses this issue:

208. See, e.g., Matthew Castillon, 70% of Workers Are Likely to Quit at Current $7.25 Federal
Minimum Wage in ‘Brutal’ Turnover Cycle, CNBC (Sept. 25, 2019, 8:30 AM), https://www.cnbc.
com/2019/09/25/70percent-of-workers-are-likely-to-quit-at-current-federal-minimumwage.html [https://perma.cc/QZ8G-K64J]. An analysis by CNBC determined that turnover
rate is more than twice the national average when employees are paid the federal minimum
wage of $7.25. Id.
209. Interview with Marcos, Dishwasher, in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on file
with author).
210. Interview with Marion, Unemployed, in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on file
with author).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 11, at 20; BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 13, at 5.
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Because our nation has no rational immigration system
providing a path to citizenship and no strong worker protections for immigrants, many immigrants find themselves
in vulnerable situations. They are desperate to work to support themselves and their families; at the same time, they
face enormous backlash from communities that are scapegoating the nation’s economic woes on immigrants (not a
new approach in U.S. history), and they are terrified of being deported. This creates a context that makes it easy for
216
employers to exploit undocumented workers.
For an unscrupulous employer, the cheapest labor comes without
papers. Undocumented immigrants can be—and frequently are—
paid less than the minimum wage, or nothing at all, because employers understand that many of these people live in fear of the
law. This situation constitutes what Professor Elizabeth Fussell dubs
the “deportation threat dynamic,” where employers assume, often
correctly, that the Spanish-speaking people they hire will not report wage theft because they are afraid of government authori217
ties.
Concerns over retaliation exist even in places with powerful antiretaliation laws. The District, for instance, prohibits “any person
acting on behalf of the employer” from threatening or punishing
any person who has made a complaint or “is believed to have made
a complaint” to any person alleging that they have not been paid
218
properly. This is a broad prohibition. Read plainly, it covers not
only workers who go to the government or file a lawsuit, but also
those who informally complain to their supervisors that they have
been underpaid.
But retaliation is a hard thing to prove. Along with almost every
state, the District practices at-will employment, which means that
employers can fire workers for almost any reason or for no reason
219
at all. It is easy for employers to come up with alternative, plausible excuses for why somebody has been let go or had their hours
reduced, understanding that the real reason can be shrouded behind the logic of at-will employment. Even when the District government finds out about alleged retaliation, it is slow to act. In fis-

216. BOBO, supra note 10, at 46.
217. Elizabeth Fussell, The Deportation Threat Dynamic and Victimization of Latino Migrants:
Wage Theft and Robbery, 52 SOC. Q. 593, 593–96 (2011); see also Gleeson, supra note 138, at 91,
97.
218. D.C. CODE § 32-1311(a)–(b) (2017).
219. At-Will Employment – Overview, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 15, 2008),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-employment-overview.aspx
[https://perma.cc/C9YB-2FWL].
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cal year 2019, the DOES took an average of 42 days to even contact
employers accused of retaliation and 117 days to resolve those
220
complaints. Many times, this is too little, too late. Given the precarious nature of low-wage workers’ lives, the damage has already
been done before the agency reaches out to the employer.
2. Concerns Over Navigating the System
“I live in a world of fear. So, I haven’t really worked steady in a
while,” says Agda, who moonlights as a bartender while pursuing
221
an advanced degree. “I have a kid to support and bills to pay.
The stress level is insurmountable some days, you know? It’s really
222
223
hard.” As is common in the service industry, Agda’s employers
have, over the years, stolen her tips, paid less than promised, and
224
paid less than minimum wage. Like many, Agda is aware of her
rights and expresses anger over these acts. But despite this, she has
never taken formal legal action.
[I]t’s a lot of work . . . a lot of follow up. They want this,
they want that, then they want to call the employer and
then it’s like, you know, either you’ve moved on from that
job and you just don’t want to deal with it anymore, you
don’t want to see them anymore, or it didn’t end well anyway . . . . [Y]ou just don’t want to deal with it, you know?
225
There’s a lot of mental aspects to it.
These feelings are common. Legal claims are time consuming
and intimidating, and many low-wage workers report that they do
not pursue their legal claims because they feel ill-equipped to navigate the legal system. Among those I spoke to, more than half
(55%) named this barrier to claiming, which has two aspects:
workers lack the procedural knowledge of how and where to assert
their rights, and they are also—like Agda—intimidated by the prospect of legal action.
Many ordinary people do not understand even the basics of how
to bring a lawsuit or make an administrative claim. For most, a law220. Letter from Tony A. Robinson, FOIA Officer, Dep’t of Emp. Servs., to author (Dec.
2, 2019) [hereinafter D.C. FOIA Data 2019] (on file with author) (unpublished response to
Freedom of Information Act Request).
221. Interview with Agda, Bartender & Student, in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript
on file with author).
222. Id.
223. See Galvin, supra note 21, at 331.
224. Interview with Agda, supra note 221.
225. Id.
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suit is out of the question. Even filing one is complicated, to say
226
nothing of the many processes that follow. The confusing nature
of the legal system, after all, is a big part of the reason why people
hire lawyers.
In theory, agencies like the DOES are supposed to provide a
softer and more accessible avenue for rights enforcement. In practice, many workers are unsure of how to even take the first step to
trigger these agency procedures. Charlotte Alexander and Arthi
Prasad found that 77% of surveyed low-wage workers did not know
227
how or where to file a complaint about their workplace issues. In
short, “low-wage, front-line workers often lack the legal knowledge”
228
to meaningfully enforce their own rights.
This is partly due to the confusing and sprawling nature of the
administrative state. There are multiple federal agencies that regulate workplace civil rights, including the DOL, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB). To make things more confusing, there
are also parallel state- and city-level agencies. In the District, there
is the DOES, the Public Employee Relations Board, and the Office
of Human Rights.
As with low-wage workers in general, many people in the District
do not know where to begin to figure out how to assert their rights.
“I don’t know where I should go or to whom I should talk,” says
229
Sabbir, a former fast food worker who never got overtime. “And
maybe there’s a way we can fight about it, but I don’t know the way,
230
how I should start, or how to do it.” Even those who are familiar
with, for example, the DOES express confusion. Cora, who we met
in the Introduction, speaks well of DOES and has participated in a
variety of agency-run programs designed to help out-of-work residents. But when asked whether she might file a wage claim, she
expresses confusion: “I don’t know. And I wouldn’t know how to
231
do it.”
But workers who know what they can do are nevertheless reluctant to take formal legal action because they are not confident that
they can successfully navigate the system. Like Agda, these workers
are not held back by a lack of procedural knowledge but a desire to
avoid a process that is intimidating, confusing, time-consuming,
and emotionally draining. The path of least resistance often in-

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

See Fritz-Mauer, supra note 12, at 102–03 (2016).
Alexander & Prasad, supra note 64, at 1095.
Id. at 1098.
Telephone Interview with Sabbir, supra note 63.
Id.
Interview with Cora, supra note 2.
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volves ignoring the problem or moving on. In many ways, and for
many people, it is easier to swallow the frustration and pain of
wage theft than to deal with the hassle of fighting an uphill battle.
For example, Miranda worked at a large department store that
232
frequently underpaid her. After it happened once, she started to
carefully track her hours in a notebook. Four or five times, she
used her own records to confront her supervisor; four or five times,
233
her employer cut her a check. Not surprisingly, Miranda was not
alone. “[My supervisor] gave me a check, and after I did it, four
other people had to get checks!” Miranda says. 234 The employees
got together and talked about filing a group complaint with DOES,
but ultimately gave up the idea. “I thought about going to the wage
and labor board,” she explains,
because a lot of people were complaining about it and I
thought, ‘there’s power in numbers.’ If a group of us feel
that we’ve been treated unfairly, then probably it’d be
quicker than it just being one person. But of course, mostly
everybody at that point that was going through the same injustice I was going through just wanted to get the hell out
235
of there.
Eventually, that is what Miranda herself did, deciding it would be
236
simpler and easier to just move on to a new job.
3. Lack of Power, Lack of Faith
The last major barrier to claiming is that many low-wage workers
do not believe that speaking up will do any good. Agitating at work
or filing a complaint is not likely to achieve justice, and worse,
could carry significant costs. There are also two aspects to this barrier to claiming: First, low-wage workers have a keen understanding
of the stark power imbalance that exists between them and their
employers; second, they lack faith in the government, and do not
believe that it will protect or advocate for them.
As discussed in Section III.C.1, this imbalance is amplified when
a person is economically or socially vulnerable, which explains why
wage theft is more pronounced among the working poor, undoc-

232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Interview with Miranda, supra note 65.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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umented immigrants, non-unionized employees, women, and mi237
norities. As Maria, a cleaner, puts it, “[employers] have the money, they have the power, and it’s your word against their word so I
238
don’t think there’s anything you can really do about it.”
Employers understand this power imbalance, and many use it to
their advantage. When Ameen’s former boss, an ambassador to the
United States, taunted him by inviting him to file a lawsuit over his
239
unpaid wages, the ambassador was relying on the fact that
Ameen has very little money and no legal knowledge. When Cora’s
supervisor threatened to fire her after Cora demanded her wag240
es, she was sending a clear message about speaking up. Employers like these, who refuse to comply with the most basic workplace
laws, do so confidently because they can do so with impunity. It is a
theme that activists and attorneys see repeatedly. Allen Cardenas,
who coordinated a legal clinic that focuses heavily on wage theft
complaints, explains that:
Fear and intimidation [are] what threaten[] workers the
most. . . . They usually have family to support, they have
bills, and they don’t have the time to stop working and find
a new job if they raise hell at their current job. Stability’s
important for them, and I understand why you’re scared to
ruffle some feathers, because it could cost you your job and
241
it might mean that your kids can’t eat.
Workers hear these messages loud and clear, and they understand
how employers strategize around this power dynamic. “[W]hen
people know they can take advantage of others to their own benefits, and they know the other person is kind of scared to even reach
out or even find information, they have what they want,” says Na242
omi, summing up the perspective of many. This power imbalance, of course, also feeds into the fear of retaliation that many
people have. As discussed above, retaliation can take many forms
and be hard to prove, and workplace disputes often come down to
one person’s word against another’s. This is thin proof upon which

237. COOPER & KROEGER, supra note 11, at 8, 21–28; BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 13, at
41–48.
238. Telephone Interview with Maria, Cleaner, in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript
on file with author).
239. Interview with Ameen, supra note 54.
240. Interview with Cora, supra note 2.
241. Interview with Allen Cardenas, Clinic Coordinator, Washington Laws.’ Comm. for
Civ. Rts. and Urb. Affs., in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on file with author).
242. Interview with Naomi, Low-wage Worker, in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on
file with author).
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to risk a claim and, perhaps even worse, retaliation. One stakeholder describes a typical retaliatory event:
When you’re told you’ll be taken off the schedule, it’s not
like you’re getting a formal e-mail in writing where you
have any proof of this. It’s an interpersonal conversation,
oftentimes with nobody else around to hear. It’s your word
against theirs, so workers have very little power to react
against it, to push back, to prove offensive retaliation where
243
it is happening in the workplace.
This present lack of power that many people feel is compounded
by the second aspect to this barrier to claiming: many low-income
people lack faith in the government and do not trust it to serve
them well. In D.C.—as well as many other places—this belief is justified by the poor job that the government does at enforcing basic
wage and hour laws. This might sound surprising. After all, the District recently passed one of the most powerful anti-wage theft laws
244
in the country. But the fact is, D.C. and many other governments
245
are largely inactive. Responsible agencies fail to build lasting relationships around the issue, investigate wrongdoing, process complaints quickly, and vigorously apply the law.
The numbers from the District tell the story of a government
agency failing its mandate. In the District, the sub-agency responsible for investigating and remediating wage theft is the Office of
Wage-Hour (OWH), which is contained within DOES. OWH has
about 30 full-time employees and an annual budget of approxi246
mately $3.6 million.
These might sound like large numbers, but they are inadequate
compared to the frequency and impact of wage theft. OWH simply
does not have the staff or money that it should. Beyond that,
though, the agency itself does a poor job of enforcement. In particular, there are three serious problems with OWH, which are
likely repeated in dozens of places across the country, and which
contribute to workers’ lack of faith in the government.
First, OWH misses the overwhelming majority of instances of
wage theft. By its own numbers, it does not learn of more than
99.5% of all minimum wage violations, receiving fewer than 100
complaints while conservatively estimating that there are nearly

243.
244.
245.
246.

Interview with Joanna Blotner, supra note 195.
See infra Section IV.A.
See supra Section II.E.
GOV’T OF D.C., FY 2020 APPROVED BUDGET AND FINANCIAL PLAN B-94 (2019).
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247

40,000 violations per year. And although employers commit wage
theft in all its various forms with stunning frequency, the agency
receives only 700–800 wage theft-related complaints total each
year.
Second, workers who go to OWH experience significant delays
and problems, leaving many feeling cast aside and ill-served. To be
fair, OWH has made improvements to its timeline in recent years,
and in fiscal year 2019 even adhered to the statutory requirement
that it issue an initial ruling within 60 days of serving an employer
248
with a complaint. In crucial ways, though, it is slow and inefficient. It takes about 51 days to serve an employer. Worst of all, retaliation complaints languish. On average, it takes the agency
about 117 days to resolve complaints—including six weeks to even
make initial contact with the employer.
Olivia experienced these delays firsthand. After she filed a claim
for unpaid wages using DOES’ online form, she heard nothing for
249
three weeks. Eventually, she contacted OWH, who put her in
touch with the investigator in charge of her case. Over the next
several weeks, he asked her questions she had already answered
and requested documents she had already submitted—in some
250
cases more than once. In particular, it was clear that the agency
had lost the key pieces of evidence she had attached to her initial
complaint, including her offer letter, pay stubs, and termination
251
letter. It took the agency seven weeks to even issue a complaint to
her former employer, and for the next six months she saw almost
252
no movement on her claim.
There are real costs to this beyond the aggravation of slowmoving justice. A great deal can happen in a short amount of time,
especially to vulnerable people. For example, after Lisa, a counselor at a transitional living facility for teen moms, successfully pursued a claim for unpaid overtime through OWH, her employer, a
faith-based non-profit, suddenly and illegally evicted her from the
apartment complex that the organization housed its employees
253
in. Lisa wound up living in her car, depressed, hungry, and des-

247. In a study commissioned by DOES, researchers used Census data to estimate the
frequency of minimum wage violations in the District, and predicted that in 2015, 39,502
were paid less than the minimum wage. YE ZHANG, MASON MILLER & PAULA MIAN, MINIMUM
WAGE IMPACT STUDY 39 (2017). The office, however, receives fewer than 100 complaints annually involving “minimum wage/overtime.” D.C. FOIA Data 2019, supra note 220, at 3.
248. See D.C. FOIA Data 2019, supra note 220, at 3.
249. Text Message from Olivia, supra note 7.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Interview with Lisa, Couns., in Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on file with author).
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254

perate. She filed a retaliation complaint with OWH, but it never
255
went anywhere. She saw some movement early on, but only in the
256
face of Lisa’s “persistent persistence.” “I would push it [forward],” Lisa explains, “then I would stand back because I didn’t
want to go through the pain” of having to constantly pursue jus257
tice. Almost two years after the fact, Lisa had given up on the
agency resolving her retaliation claim one way or the other.
258
“There’s no driving force from their end . . . ,” she says.
The third crippling problem with OWH is that the agency imposes light judgments and collects little money. District law states
259
that the government “shall” (meaning must ) require employers
who steal wages to pay aggrieved workers liquidated damages equal
260
to triple their unpaid wages. The only way employers can avoid
this mandate is by admitting their fault when the agency first contacts them, which reduces the liquidated damages from 300% of
261
unpaid wages to just 100%. Realistically, few employers take this
route. Instead, the strong majority ignore the agency or contest the
claims, meaning it is reasonable to expect that if OWH is applying
the law as written, aggregate liquidated damages imposed by the
agency will land much closer to 300% than to 100% of unpaid
wages.
This is far from the case. OWH does not seriously sanction the
bad actors who come before it. Last year, through its complaintbased process, the agency assessed about $483,000 in unpaid wages
262
but only about $451,000 in liquidated damages. In other words,
the agency does not even impose liquidated damages of 100% of
unpaid wages against recalcitrant employers, much less the treble
damages envisioned by the Wage Theft Prevention Act. Nor does
OWH collect much money: During the same period of time, the
agency took in about $194,000 in unpaid wages (40% of the total
assessed that year) and only $70,500 in liquidated damages (15.5%
263
of the total assessed).

254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics v. D.C., 866 A.2d 788, 796 (D.C. 2005).
260. D.C. CODE §§ 32-1308.01(c)(6)–(7) (2017).
261. Id. § 1308.01(c)(4) (2017).
262. D.C. FOIA Data 2019, supra note 220, at 3.
263. Id. OWH also has the authority to level fines and penalties, which flow to the government rather than the aggrieved worker. D.C. CODE § 32-1307.01(b) (2017). The agency’s
collection rate for these sanctions are even worse. In FY 2019, it collected less than 5% of
what it assessed. D.C. FOIA Data 2019, supra note 220, at 3.
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To summarize: DOES is unaware of the overwhelming majority
of instances of wage theft that take place in the District. Because it,
like many enforcement bodies, eschews proactive enforcement
264
strategies in favor of passive processes, it rarely takes any action
on behalf of those who suffer wage theft. This includes—by the
government’s own estimates—more than 99.5% of workers whose
employers pay them less than minimum wage. When people do
complain, the agency is slow to contact their employers, process
their cases, and protect them from retaliation. Finally, once OWH
does process a person’s claim, it gives employers far more lenient
punishments than are required by the law, failing to either impose
meaningful judgments or enforce penalties and collect money.
The slow burn of this process breeds resentment among the
class of people who have nowhere to turn but to the government
for help. Frequently, those who go to DOES feel frustrated, disregarded, and ill-served. “It’s no good,” says Caleb, speaking about
the agency’s employees. “[Y]ou come to work, but you don’t go to
work! [I]t looks like, down DOES, looks like you’re going to
church. Everybody dressed up, looking good, but you ain’t doing
265
nothing!”
Some people view the government and its employees as inefficient and unmotivated, if not outright lazy. But others take a much
more cynical view. It is not just that the government is inefficient.
The system itself is designed to favor the Haves at the expense of
266
the Have-Nots. Earl, the journeyman plumber we met in the Introduction, is one such cynic. He describes a race to the bottom in
the construction industry, where contractors refuse to hire District
residents, deny overtime, pay unfairly low wages, and engage in
rampant misclassification. “[T]hese companies that have come into
this city to do work have no licenses to do work, but it’s okay for
267
them to work,” he says. He does not mean that they are operating legally. Far from it. Earl’s point is that the city’s leadership is
not interested in taking meaningful action. “There’s definitely a
lack of political will! There’s something in it for them. I mean, every politician wants something out of it. If I’m gonna do something
268
for you, what do I get out of it?”
The notion that wage theft may be effectively attacked through
policies of individual empowerment is consistent with the idea that

264. See Fine, supra note 102, at 361; see also Weil, supra note 186, at 4–5.
265. Id.
266. See Marc Galanter, Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
267. Interview with Earl, supra note 4.
268. Id.
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wage theft is a personal harm best addressed through the passive
enforcement mechanisms of the civil justice system. But the fact is,
workers who have their wages stolen do not come forward, even
when the law reflects the gold standard of anti-wage theft reforms.
The barriers to claiming are serious, effectively precluding the
vast majority of low-wage workers—even well-educated ones—from
pursuing formal legal action. The common thread tying these impediments together is the low status that these people have on the
social and economic hierarchies of society. But while these problems are significant, they are not insurmountable. There are concrete policy changes that would effectively address these concerns.
The next Part details what changes must be implemented if jurisdictions want to do more than just attack wage theft at the margins.
IV. REFORMS IN CONTEXT
This Article has debunked two key ideas about wage theft. First,
that it is rightly understood as an individual harm; and second, that
wage theft can be and should be addressed through policy choices
that, on their face, empower or incentivize private actors to enforce the law. Although workers’ rights advocates broadly understand that these premises are false, they are still powerful and influential, and drive both formal legal reform and how the
government enforces workplace laws.
269
“Bottom-up workplace law enforcement,” which necessarily
depends on low-wage workers holding employers accountable, is
destined to fail in its current form. Because of the significant barriers that effectively preclude the vast majority of low-wage workers
from bringing formal claims, this approach will only ever, at most,
attack wage theft on the margins. By and large, the workers who do
come forward and pursue formal rights enforcement fall into two
groups. First, they are people who have experienced wage theft
that is, to them, uniquely severe or offensive. Ameen, for instance,
did not pursue formal legal action until his unpaid wages crested
270
$40,000 and threatened him with homelessness. Lisa stayed silent
until one egregious week where she worked dozens of hours of
271
overtime and still received only her base salary.
The second group consists of those workers who have left their
jobs. At that point, the calculus of risk changes dramatically; retaliation stops being an overriding concern, and for some, the poten269.
270.
271.

Alexander & Prasad, supra note 64.
Interview with Ameen, supra note 54.
Interview with Lisa, supra note 253.
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tial monetary and emotional benefits of bringing a claim start to
outweigh the expected costs. Recall Maynor, whose eventual wage
272
claim ultimately resulted in a $100,000 judgment in his favor.
Although his wage theft was blatant and damaging, he did not take
action until his employer fired him.
Despite these practical realities, most government agencies rely
273
on a passive, complaint-based approach to enforcement. This is
an inherently reactive strategy: the government waits for workers to
report their employers for wage theft, and then acts to bring those
specific employers into compliance. It is also ineffective.
But this situation is neither hopeless nor intractable. To meaningfully attack wage theft, jurisdictions must re-orient how they
think about and address it. They must understand, first, that wage
theft is a widespread social problem that requires a public response.
Statutory legal reforms are important, but they must reflect this
fact and, in recognition of the practical barriers to private enforcement, empower institutions to action—not just private individuals. Those institutions must also recognize the inadequacy of passive, private enforcement schemes and adopt a model of strategic
enforcement, which focuses on shifting entire industries by costeffectively bringing justice to workers instead of waiting for them to
step forward. This Part outlines the bare minimum of legal and
strategic reforms that jurisdictions should implement if they hope
to meaningfully address this problem.
A. Statutory Changes: Adopting the District of Columbia’s
Enforcement Regime
Standing alone, the District’s statutory reforms are insufficient.
But they are still a crucial first step, and any jurisdiction concerned
about wage theft must, at a minimum, adopt them.
To reiterate, D.C. created a legal framework that, on paper,
promises aggressive rights enforcement. It imposes significant fines
and penalties and entitles claimants to recover three times their
unpaid wages as damages. Furthermore, the District’s recordkeeping requirements and generous fee-shifting provisions make it easier for a larger class of people to find legal representation and
prove their claim. Perhaps most importantly, D.C.’s recent reforms
significantly expanded the power of the government to find and
punish wage theft. The Office of the Attorney General has inde-

272.
273.

Interview with Maynor, supra note 161.
Galanter, supra note 266.
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274

pendent enforcement authority, and the DOES has broad power
275
to investigate, punish, and remediate wage theft.
The quantitative and qualitative facts about wage theft in the
District underscore how these reforms have not, for many, lived up
to their promise. But the city’s legal framework has the potential to
be incredibly effective and contains tools that could be—and
sometimes have been—wielded to great effect. Jurisdictions that
wish to meaningfully enforce basic workplace standards should, at
a minimum, adopt these same reforms.
B. Additional Reforms: Misclassification and
Private Institutional Action
Because individuals are extremely unlikely to even attempt formal
rights enforcement, reforms should empower institutions with new
authority. This institutional response should come primarily from
public entities, which are able to collect, distribute, and leverage
resources in a way that most private actors cannot. But there are
also non-governmental institutions that can and do play an important role in labor standards enforcement.
In particular, workers’ rights-based non-profit organizations and
labor unions are naturally incentivized to find and prosecute wage
theft. These institutions are ideologically motivated to protect the
rights of working people and, additionally, unions are directly
threatened by employers whose labor practices are illegal. This is
especially true in the construction industry because contracts are
typically assigned to the lowest bidder, and contractors can cut
their costs by nearly one-third just by misclassifying their employ276
ees. Legal reforms should do more to leverage these institutional
actors by creating qui tam causes of action regarding independent
contractor misclassification.
As discussed in Part I, misclassification is a common form of
wage theft. In addition to the problems already discussed, independent contractors are responsible for paying a higher tax rate
on their earnings than employees. Employees and employers share
the burden of payroll taxes, with each paying 7.65%; in contrast,

274. D.C. CODE § 32-1306(a)(2) (2018) (stating that “[t]he Attorney General, acting in
the public interest, including the need to deter future violations, may bring a civil action . . .
against an employer or other person” who violates various wage and hour laws).
275. See D.C. CODE § 32-1308.01 (2017).
276. Tom Juravich, Essie Ablavsky & Jake Williams, The Epidemic of Wage Theft in Residential Construction in Massachusetts 1–2 (UMass-Amherst Lab. Ctr., Working Paper, 2015).
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independent contractors, must pay the entire 15.3% themselves.
These costs quickly add up: a misclassified worker making just
$20,000 per year can expect to pay an extra $1,530 in taxes.
In most jurisdictions, it is too difficult for private actors to recover the cost of these extra taxes from employers because they can278
not sue for them. There simply is not a cause of action. A misclassified worker’s only real option is to fill out various forms with
279
the IRS. The IRS is then supposed to investigate the situation
and determine whether the filer is an employee or independent
contractor. 280 After that, the IRS might adjust the worker’s tax lia281
bility.
This process is less direct and more complicated than it should
be. Future legislative changes should both 1) enable misclassified
employees to directly sue their employers for overpaid taxes and 2)
incentivize institutions to action through qui tam provisions.
Qui tam provisions empower private actors to file civil lawsuits to
282
enforce a government interest. They are most commonly associated with the federal False Claims Act, although they harken back
283
to thirteenth century England. Under the False Claims Act, either the Attorney General or a private party (called a “relator”)
may sue a third party who has (allegedly) defrauded the govern284
ment by making a false claim for payment. After the relator files
suit, the government has 60 days to investigate and decide whether
285
it will prosecute the case. If it does, then the relator may still participate as a party and is entitled to recover up to 25% of the final
286
damages plus reasonable attorney’s fees. If the government pass-

277. Randy Gardner et al., Independent Contractor or Employee?, 26 J. FIN. PLAN. 31, 31–32
(2013).
278. See Glanville v. Dupar, 727 F. Supp. 2d 596, 599–602 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (explaining
that the broad trend in federal courts is to find there is no private cause of action to sue
employers for unpaid payroll taxes).
279. In particular, people can assert their employer has unpaid payroll taxes by filing
Form 8919 with their taxes. See About Form 8919, Uncollected Social Security and Medicare Tax on
Wages, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-8919 [https://perma.cc/HVM727BE] (last updated Sept. 22, 2020). Workers may also request a classification determination
from the IRS by filing Form SS-8. About Form SS-8, Determination of Worker Status for Purposes of
Federal Employment Taxes and Income Tax Withholding, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/formspubs/about-form-ss-8 [https://perma.cc/83QR-RRBD] (last updated Sept. 20, 2020).
280. I.R.S. Notice 989 (Rev. 8-2015) (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/n989.pdf.
281. Id.
282. Christina Orsini Broderick, Qui Tam Provisions and the Public Interest: An Empirical
Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 949, 951 (2007).
283. Id. at 951–52.
284. 31 U.S.C. § 3729; 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1).
285. Id. § 3730(b)(2).
286. Id. § 3730(c)(1), (d)(1).
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es on the case, the relator may pursue it and, if successful, recover
287
up to 30% of damages plus attorney’s fees.
Applying these same principles and procedures to the issue of
independent contractor misclassification would serve the public
interest in three ways. First, it would fill a gap in the law, creating a
way for workers to recover for a distinct harm. Second, it would
provide a powerful tool for attacking and redressing bad behavior
by further incentivizing institutions to bring charges. Not only
would the government learn about viable cases, but non-profit organizations, labor unions, and private law firms have knowledge,
resources, and power that individual victims of wage theft do not,
and therefore have power that ordinary working people lack. Finally, such suits would recover unpaid taxes.
C. Strategic Enforcement: Moving Beyond A Passive Approach
Written legal reforms can only do so much. As important as protective statutes are, it is just as crucial that policymakers adopt enforcement strategies that acknowledge the realities of wage theft
and account for the barriers that, for all practical purposes, prevent individual rights enforcement. Most government agencies do
not do this, however. As discussed in Part II, wage and hour enforcers largely employ a passive, complaint-based approach.
This is a fundamentally inadequate way to combat wage theft,
but it is not the only one. In the ongoing conversation about policing labor standards, there is a concept known as “strategic enforcement.” In summary, strategic enforcement is about the effective use of limited resources to achieve the long-term goal of
288
enhancing compliance with basic workplace laws. It is “a deliberate approach to change the practices of wage violation that have
become commonplace in certain industries,” and it does so by
“tak[ing] account of industry-specific business models, dynamics,
and regulations with the goal of creating ripple effects that will influence the compliance behavior of a number of employers at
289
once.”
In part, strategic enforcement requires government agencies to
adopt new enforcement strategies. But they must also adopt a longterm mindset, with the goal being to create ongoing, sustainable
290
compliance. To that end, agencies must do three things: 1) allo-

287.
288.
289.
290.

Id. § 3730(d)(2).
Weil, supra note 186, at 1.
D.C. JUST PAY COAL., MAKING OUR LAWS REAL 4 (2018).
Weil, supra note 186, at 12–19.
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cate resources where they will have the most impact; 2) focus on
changing the behaviors that result in legal violations in the first
place; and 3) find mechanisms and implement strategies that cre291
ate ongoing compliance. This requires agencies to shed their
long-held passive habits in favor of proactive enforcement efforts,
shifting resources toward active strategies with the specific goal of
establishing a robust presence and creating industry-wide cultures
of compliance. As Professor Janice Fine explains, however, “[t]he
crisis of compliance in low-wage industries will not be solved by the
292
state alone.” To be successful, strategic enforcement “require[s]
creative collaboration between government, workers, organizations, and—where they exist and are willing to participate—high293
road firms.”
These ideas might seem intuitive and obvious. But in practice,
the idea of strategic enforcement stands in stark contrast to how
most government agencies tasked with remedying wage theft oper294
ate, including DOES and similar entities across the country. As
discussed above, most agencies essentially play whack-a-mole with
bad employers, only going after them when workers volunteer information. But low-income people almost never file complaints
with agencies.
Reactive approaches do not prevent wage theft as effectively as
proactive ones. They also leave workers open to harm because, by
definition, the government enters the equation only after employers violate the law and workers put themselves at risk. While this is
also true of the civil justice system, unlike courts, many government agencies have the explicit authority to seek out violations and
295
proactively protect workers’ rights. Unless and until they do so,
wage theft will continue to run rampant in and wreak havoc on the
lives of working people.
The remainder of this Part outlines the most important strategic
efforts that government agencies can make to achieve long-term
deterrence. As discussed below, a smart and systematic strategy requires these entities to: 1) build confidence among stakeholders,
including workers, community organizations, advocates, and em291. Id. at 2.
292. Fine, supra note 102, at 382.
293. Id. “High-road” employers are those who not only follow labor and employment
laws, but also actively work to provide decent jobs with good wages and benefits. See Principles
of High-Road Employers, AM. SUSTAINABLE BUS. COUNCIL, https://www.asbcouncil.org
/principles-high-road-employers [https://perma.cc/Z7U9-AYPH]. They are often outspoken about the importance of fair and dignified workplaces, and many would be willing to
work with the government to reduce wage theft.
294. Alexander & Prasad, supra note 64, at 1093–95.
295. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 32-1331.05(a) (2013) (establishing that the Mayor may investigate wage and hour violations “on his or her own initiative”).
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ployers; 2) engage in proactive investigations; 3) educate workers
about their substantive and procedural rights; 4) utilize all available enforcement tools and publicize such activity; and 5) adopt an
express anti-wage theft mindset.
1. Building Confidence Among Stakeholders
An effective attack on wage theft necessarily requires workers,
advocates, and employment lawyers to have confidence in the government agencies responsible for labor standards enforcement.
Many low-income people, however, express a lack of faith in government, viewing it as a distant thing defined by ineptitude or,
296
worse, corruption. Others, especially those undocumented, are
297
afraid to go to the government for help. To address these issues,
government agencies must strive to forge close working relationships with local actors, including community organizations, advocates, and employment lawyers.
Whether low-wage workers distrust or are afraid of the government, stakeholder organizations can serve as trusted intermediaries between authorities and community members. Community
leaders, labor unions, and advocates interact closely with working
people, and often have credible knowledge of wage theft. These
actors are able to conduct outreach, collect information, lend the
government some measure of their earned trust and prestige, and
help low-wage workers navigate administrative processes. By tapping into the energy and knowledge of these stakeholders, enforcement agencies could vastly improve and increase their reach
without expending significant additional resources.
Relatedly, government agencies should actively encourage administrative participation by educated activists and attorneys. In
some jurisdictions, this might require legislative reforms entitling
agency-litigants to recover reasonable attorney’s fees. But even in
298
D.C., where there is administrative fee-shifting, attorneys and activists are reluctant to engage with DOES because they report that
299
the agency is unwelcoming and hard to work with. Lawyers and
296. See supra Section III.C.3.
297. See Fussell, supra note 217, at 593–96.
298. D.C. CODE § 32-1308.01(c)(4), 01(c)(6)–(7) (2017).
299. For example, two plaintiff-side attorneys named Owen and Steve shared with me a
story about their efforts to access DOES’ administrative process on behalf of their clients.
Owen explained that they attempted to invoke the agency process for some clients, but
“[DOES] put up so many barriers to actually using it . . . . [T]he net result was that we didn’t
feel comfortable at all.” Steve added that he “also felt that there was some hostility, frankly,
to our entreaties or our attempts to invoke it!” Interview with Owen and Steve, Att’ys, in
Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on file with author).
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law school clinics, however, can play an important role. Their participation could improve efficiency and justice by helping to ensure that proof and arguments meet a high standard. If done right,
it would also build governmental prestige over time as these stakeholders become more confident in referring workers.
Finally, agencies should build relationships with high-road employers, who typically have both a financial and ideological interest
in wage and hour enforcement. In many industries, these people
are aware of which of their competitors operate in violation of the
law, and many would gladly share that information with the government.
2. Disputing and the Power of Education
As discussed, the vast majority of low-wage people who experience employment rights violations do not approach the government for help. Many of these people stay silent because they do not
understand their rights, do not know where to go for help, or do
not believe that the government will be willing or able to help
them. Agencies could address these key issues through widespread
education campaigns. These campaigns must teach people about
their rights, including where to go for help, and draw publicity to
the problem of wage theft in general.
Standing alone, education is not enough. After all, many of the
barriers to claiming analyzed in Part III preclude people from
speaking up even when they are fully aware of both their mistreatment and their legal options. But when almost 80% of low-wage
workers report that they do not know who to talk to when their
300
rights are violated, there is obviously much more work to do.
Enforcement agencies should engage in broad and sustained
campaigns to inform low-income people of their wage-related
rights. To be successful, agencies must understand the lives of
working people and make appropriate outreach efforts. Because
many low-wage workers do not own cars and rely on public transit,
agencies should place posters and signs on buses and trains. Advertisements should play on local radio stations, including in Spanish
and other prominent local languages. Most importantly, representatives from enforcement agencies should directly engage with
their constituents by going into community spaces, including
churches, shelters, and legal clinics. Face-to-face interactions are
key to making government processes and actors seem accessible,

300.

Alexander & Prasad, supra note 64, at 1095.
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dedicated, and caring. So too are communications through the
kinds of intermediaries whom community members tend to trust,
like social service non-profits and neighborhood leaders.
Similarly, the government must engage with and educate employers. A significant amount of wage theft occurs not out of malice but because of employer ignorance. Agencies should work with
employer-side organizations to develop materials that can be used
to quickly and easily inform employers and managers about their
legal obligations and the consequences for violating them. Although this kind of information is available online, it is not always
easy to find and understand. It could, however, be disseminated
cost-effectively through existing processes. For example, each time
an employer applies for or renews a business license, they should
receive key information about their workplace obligations.
Finally, education campaigns must also draw attention to wage
theft itself, explaining what it is and why it is wrong. In light of its
realities, the government should call wage theft what it is: a crime,
a violation of workers’ fundamental rights, an attack on fair competition, and an affront to the way things should be.
California and Seattle provide models for how the issue should
be framed. The California Labor Commissioner’s Office has created a dedicated, attractive, easy-to-navigate web page about wage
301
theft. This website has clear information about workers’ rights,
promises protection from retaliation (even for undocumented
workers), and has simple directions for filing a variety of com302
plaints. Similarly, the Seattle Police Department actively encourages victims of wage theft to file criminal complaints and makes it
303
easy to do so through a basic online form. These jurisdictions
have both made rights knowledge easily accessible and defined
wage theft appropriately.
3. Adopting a Model of Proactive Investigations
Perhaps most importantly, administrative bodies must move beyond their one-off, complaint-based approach to enforcing basic
workplace laws. The empirical realities presented in this Article
lead to only one conclusion: the standard, passive approach is destined to fail. Agencies must be proactive. They must bring to bear

301. See WAGE THEFT IS A CRIME, www.wagetheftisacrime.com [https://perma.cc/DC52K7LT].
302. Id.
303. Wage Theft, SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, https://www.seattle.gov/police/needhelp/wage-theft [https://perma.cc/48FX-PCRJ].
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all of their tools, manpower, and authority to pursue comprehensive investigations. This will require both expanding the frequency
of directed (agency-initiated) investigations and changing how the
government responds to individual complaints.
First, all enforcement bodies must prioritize actions and investigations in industries that are rife with noncompliance, including
304
service, manufacturing, cleaning, construction, and retail. These
businesses often employ undocumented or otherwise transient
workers who are especially vulnerable and unlikely to go to the
government for help. The demographics make investigations that
much more difficult, but there are clear examples of agencies finding success through smart strategies.
During the Obama Administration, the Wage and Hour Division
(WHD) of the DOL made significant efforts to conduct more di305
rected investigations in high-risk industries. By partnering with
worker centers, workers’ rights organizations, and labor unions,
the WHD was able to learn about and take action over schemes
306
that otherwise might have flown under the radar.
Similarly, California’s Bureau of Field Enforcement has adopted
new and unique strategies. Agents surveil businesses suspected of
wage theft to gain an understanding of who works there, what typi307
cal shifts look like, and how the businesses are run. In recognition of the insecurity and fear that low-wage workers often have,
they also conduct off-site interviews with workers prior to physical
inspections, both to protect these people and to obtain critical information in a context free of employer coercion and intimida308
tion.
Government agencies have limited resources, so it is imperative
that efforts be focused at the greatest points of leverage. A proactive model will include both random audits, like those undertaken
by departments of health across the country, and vigorous investigations based on credible information about violations. Significant
weight should be placed on tips provided by worker-friendly organizations, as these groups have credibility in the community and can
309
serve as effective intermediaries.
Finally, complaints that suggest broader problems should trigger
employer-wide investigations. When multiple people complain,
agencies should respond decisively by examining the entire busi304. See BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 13, at 31; CARRÉ, supra note 26, at 2.
305. Weil, supra note 186, at 9–10, 19–20.
306. Id. at 19–20.
307. Julie Su, Enforcing Labor Laws: Wage Theft, the Myth of Neutrality, and Agency Transformation, 37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 143, 151 (2016).
308. Id. at 151–52.
309. Id. at 153; Weil, supra note 186, at 9.
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ness. But even some individual complaints should spark broad action. Both Ruben and Lisa, for example, complained to the D.C.
DOES that they were working long hours without receiving overtime. DOES found in their favors. Ruben and Lisa also had
coworkers with the exact same job titles and duties, strongly suggesting that their employers were violating the law across the
310
board. After all, why would a business classify only one of its employees with a particular title as exempt from overtime? The agency should have requested all of their employers’ records for similarly situated employees. It did not. Ruben and Lisa toiled alone,
which not only decreased the power and the effect of the agency’s
sanction, but also left them exposed to the retaliation they later
experienced.
4. Utilizing and Publicizing Enforcement Tools
Passing robust statutes is a crucial first step to addressing wage
theft, but unused laws are only worth the paper they are printed
on. Administrative agencies should invoke their full repertoire of
tools and sanctions, but many do not.
The District illustrates this point. As discussed, the government
has broad enforcement authority. It may impose significant civil
311
and criminal sanctions; workers are entitled to treble damages;
312
the Attorney General can criminally prosecute wage thieves; the
government may deny business licenses to those who commit “will313
ful” acts of wage theft; and, most importantly, DOES has the ex314
plicit authority to proactively initiate investigations.
But these powers do not get used. Overall, DOES assesses liqui315
dated damages equal to less than 100% of assessed unpaid wages.
The Attorney General has not brought any criminal prosecutions
for wage theft, and the District has not denied business licenses to
any unscrupulous employers. Proactive investigations are unheard
of.
Given the widespread prevalence of wage theft and the anemic
enforcement of wage and hour laws in general, these patterns are
almost certainly repeated across the country. Utilizing the full
range of enforcement powers might be a controversial idea to
some. In particular, the idea of criminal prosecution is conten310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Interview with Ruben, supra note 197; Interview with Lisa, supra note 253.
D.C. CODE § 32-1308(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2017).
D.C. CODE §§ 32-1306(a)(1) (2018); D.C. CODE § 1307(a) (2017).
D.C. CODE § 32-1308(i) (2017).
D.C. CODE § 32-1331.05(a) (2013).
D.C. FOIA Data 2019, supra note 220, at 3.
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tious. But while criminal prosecutions probably cannot be the silver bullet to the heart of wage theft, they can be an important and
necessary aspect of a thorough and effective enforcement plan.
First, sometimes they are simply appropriate, either because employers engage in such egregious schemes that they deserve a
harsher-than-normal punishment, or because employers are judgment-proof and cannot be effectively punished by monetary sanctions. The kinds of fly-by-night operators who frequently steal wages in the underground economy are, often, effectively immune to
civil judgments because they simply do not have real assets. Private
attorneys will not sue them, and even government agencies have a
hard time leveling monetary sanctions. As Paul DeCamp, the former head of the WHD under President George W. Bush explains:
[I]t’s a little bit like whack-a-mole. Because a lot of these
companies, they pop up, somebody hears about a problem,
that company goes away. The person flees, opens up a new
company under a different name, maybe in a different
state, and you can expend an extraordinary amount of . . .
resources trying to track down these folks with [a] ques317
tionable return at the end.
In these circumstances, there cannot be justice or deterrence
unless there are criminal sanctions. Prosecutions send a powerful
message: wage theft is a crime and the government takes it seriously. Bringing and publicizing criminal charges would help inspire
low-wage workers to trust and cooperate with the government and
would also signal to employers that they cannot expect to freely violate the law.
5. Adopting an Anti-Wage Theft Mindset
Finally, strategic enforcement requires agencies to adopt smart
strategies and the right mindset. They must always keep overall
goals in mind and think carefully about how to best apply limited
resources to achieve long-term, industry-wide compliance. A failure
to embrace this mode of thinking and to understand the lives and
experiences of low-income victims of wage theft has led govern-

316. See Fritz-Mauer, supra note 12, at 118–20 (discussing the issue of criminalizing wage
theft).
317. Interview with Paul DeCamp, Member of the Firm, Epstein Becker & Green P.C., in
Washington, D.C. (2018) (transcript on file with author).
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ment bodies to adopt enforcement strategies that are complaintdriven and ineffective.
To an extent, the standard approach is understandable. Responding to complaints yields short-term successes, and evaluating
investigators based on how quickly they dispose of complaints is an
easy metric by which to measure progress. But a complaint-driven
orientation does not create the kinds of cultural shifts necessary for
long-term deterrence. The best strategy for attacking wage theft is
not always the one that yields the fastest or most easily-measured
results. The best strategy is one that builds long-term relationships
and creates ongoing compliance in an industry as a whole. The
suggestions in this Part will help accomplish those goals.
For these changes to truly be successful, however, wage and hour
agencies must also institute organizational shifts. They must adopt
a clear-eyed and empathetic understanding of what the lives of lowwage workers are actually like. Many of the people who work at enforcement bodies might already have this knowledge, but, broadly
speaking, that is not reflected in how their organizations operate.
Simply put, it is entirely unrealistic to expect a passive, individualized strategy to be effective when it is a fact that the vast majority of
workers whose wages are stolen will never go to the government for
help.
Some would assert that when agencies adopt the reforms suggested here, they actually hinder their overall mission. The argument is this: government agencies are supposed to be neutral, unbiased, and fair. Bureaucratic processes were created, in part, to
impose neutrality and avoid conflicts of interest. Forging close
connections with workers’ rights organizations, conducting focused investigations, declaring wage theft to be a “crime”—all of
these tactics will decrease the political capital and overall credibility of an agency by marking it as a partisan and biased actor. This
mindset is what former California Labor Commissioner Julie Su
318
calls the “myth of neutrality.” As she explains, the myth consists
of two underlying premises: first, the government should not appear to take sides, and second, it should not disrupt the status quo,
319
because the normal way of doing things is neutral in some way.
This is the wrong way to think about the role of an agency like
DOES or the DOL, and so long as decisionmakers adopt this mindset, wage theft will continue to be a widespread and deeply harmful
social problem. The government bodies responsible for enforcing
workplace standards are, fundamentally, on the side of the law.

318.
319.

Su, supra note 307, at 148–49.
Id.
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That means they are on the same side as workers who experience
wage theft, and they are also on the side of high-road employers
who do not commit wage theft but must suffer the unfair competitive consequences. But these agencies are not, and should not even
appear to be, sympathetic to employers who violate the law. Nor
should they seem to be neutral regarding those businesses or the
topic of wage theft itself.
This does not mean that the government should not be fair and
evenhanded in its enforcement of the law. Far from it. Like the police, wage and hour bodies are charged with finding, punishing,
and stopping a crime, and they must do so vigorously. In other
words, a serious policy solution to this problem does not include
administrative enforcement agencies accepting wage claims as gospel; it requires only that the agency treat such claims as legitimate,
serious, worthy of robust investigation and, if credible, deserving of
all available legal sanctions. Embracing this approach will lead to
the kinds of institutional cultural shifts that are necessary for strategic enforcement to work as it should.
CONCLUSION
Wage theft is a pressing problem. It inflames the evils of poverty,
violates society’s most basic workplace standards, and creates devastating cascading harms. For working people, every dollar matters,
and the loss of even a relatively small amount of money can threaten hunger, homelessness, and the loss of the basic necessities of
modern life. Workers frequently report powerful feelings of anger
and depression, as they feel frustrated by and helpless to do anything about their workplace rights violations. These are the facts
even in the District, which has some of the most robust anti-wage
theft laws in the entire country.
Individuals are not the only victims of wage theft, though. Every
year, wage theft siphons billions of dollars away from communities,
rendering millions more desperate, poor, and vulnerable than they
would and should otherwise be. It warps labor markets, denies legitimate employers the right to fair competition, weakens key social safety net programs, and hides billions of dollars from all levels
of government. It is so frequent, flagrant, and costly that it can only
be understood as a social problem.
But by and large, our response to wage theft has not accounted
for its empirical realities. While statutory reforms have been important and inspiring, they largely rely on individual empowerment as the primary means of attacking the problem. Even where
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the government has the authority to take significant action, enforcement agencies rarely invoke the power of their mandates.
Wage theft is a complex problem, an act that preys upon vulnerabilities and an ill that plagues society at large. It is old, it is common, and it will never go away—not entirely. But much more can
be done. Wage theft can be effectively confronted with thoughtful
policy solutions. With the right reforms and an understanding that
public problems require public solutions, institutions can build
frameworks that much more effectively deter the crime, bring justice to low-wage workers like Cora, Earl, and Olivia, and make real
the economic promise that undergirds our system: that an honest
day’s work deserves an honest day’s pay.

